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Remember, I lived in Nigeria exactly at the time the oil
boom started. The Economic Minister meets with the Prime
Minister. "Sir," he says, "I have got some good news and
bad news." The Prime Minister asks for the good news first
and is told that the country has just discovered vast re-
serves of petroleum. The Prime Minister is happy. He
says, "Well, this is great. We can accelerate income growth
in this country. What could the bad news possibly be," he
asks his Economic Minister. The reply is, "The bad news is
that we have just discovered vast reserves of petroleum."'
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his excellent editorial assistance. I take full responsibility for any errors in this
work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The story of oil and gas development in Africa is a very sad
one. From earlier developers like Nigeria to the newest entrants
such as Equatorial Guinea, petroleum production has generated a
great sense of unease. Huge revenues from royalties and oil ex-
ports flow into government coffers and pad the pockets of public
officials and their cronies. Multinational oil corporations have also
been major beneficiaries. 2 The only losers seem to be the citizens of
these countries, in particular, members of oil producing communi-
ties, who bear the brunt of the discovery and exploitation of oil
while missing out on the benefits.
There is little doubt that Africa's oil and gas producers epito-
mize the "resource curse" phenomenon-a counter-intuitive, in-
verse association between economic growth and endowment with
natural resources.3 Resource-rich countries, almost without excep-
tion, are riddled with multifarious and nefarious social, economic,
and political problems. Stories of extreme poverty, environmental
degradation, human rights abuses, authoritarianism, civil conflicts,
and wars are rife. Over the years, scholars in development eco-
nomics and political science have devoted considerable attention to
this issue.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in this subject.
One reason behind this revival is the anticipated massive inflow of
funds from new oil developments in some African countries, in-
cluding Chad, Cameroon, Sudan, Sao Tome, and Equatorial
Guinea. The hope is to ensure that these projects do not suffer the
same plight as their older counterparts, while reversing the curse
where it already exists.4
Certainly a paradigm shift is warranted, and the importance of
pragmatic solutions cannot be overemphasized. 5 The thesis being
dress, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1271, 1292 (2003).
2 See Antony Goldman, Who Benefits from Africa's Oil?, BBC NEws, Mar. 9,
2004 (noting that while oil-producing countries are among the poorest in the
world, companies producing the oil seem to benefit), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3542901.stm.
3 See RICHARD M. AuTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES:
THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS 1-7 (1993) (discussing the resource curse thesis).
4 See Paul Stevens, Resource Impact - Curse or Blessing?, 13 CENTRE FOR ENERGY,
PETROLEUM & MINERAL L. & POL'Y INTERNET J. 1, 14 (Mar. 25, 2003) (discussing the
distinction between a "blessing" and a "curse" and how countries securing oil
revenues can avoid the "curse"), at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/
html/vo113/voH13-14.html.
5 See XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN & ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, ADDRESSING THE NAT-
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propounded here is that, notwithstanding the fact that the results
in African oil exporters suggest the presence of a resource curse,
these countries are not necessarily cursed by their resources. What
they have been beset with is a curse of leadership. Leaders repre-
senting different regime types and periods of time have shown
similar traits in misgoverning their people and misusing their re-
sources. They have also not introduced the right kind of manage-
ment structures to ensure the use of these resources in a way that
benefits their citizens. There seems to be a growing recognition
that for meaningful changes to occur, the structure of resource
management in these countries needs to undergo some fundamen-
tal changes. Two key ideas that illustrate this thinking, and that
have been generating a lot of interest of late, are information dis-
closure and what this Article refers to as "trust funds." Trust
funds aim to create a transparent and more beneficial process of
managing and monitoring oil revenues, a departure from the cor-
rupt and unaccountable arrangements that currently characterize
oil and gas development in Africa. Information disclosure, exem-
plified by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (the
"EITI") and the Publish What You Pay (the "PWYP") Campaign,
promotes the publishing of corporate payments to governments
and calls on governments to disclose their oil receipts. The object
is to ensure that oil revenues are fully accounted for and properly
utilized.
Both ideas incorporate a leading role for multinational corpora-
tions ("MNCs") and international financial institutions, notably the
World Bank Group. 6 This Article takes an interdisciplinary ap-
proach drawing on economics, law, and political science to evalu-
ate these ideas with a view to ascertaining their ability to avert or
reverse the curse.
In addition, this Article will look at the major impediments to
implementing these ideas in Africa, the most prominent of which
are state sovereignty and the absence of corporate regulation in in-
ternational law. To counter such impediments, this Article advo-
URAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN ILLUSTRATION FROM NIGERIA 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9804, 2003) (proffering one such idea that involves
directly distributing the oil revenues to the public), available at http://pape
rs.nber.org/papers/w9804.pdf.
6 The International Monetary Fund ("IMF') has also been involved in seeking
ways to address the resource curse, especially in Africa. See, e.g., MENACHEM KATZ
ET AL., LIFTING THE OIL CURSE: IMPROVING PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2004) (discussing macroeconomic and oil sector policy, and
governance issues of seven oil-producing countries of Africa).
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cates a restructuring of international law in two major areas: re-
definition of the notion of sovereignty and a clearer articulation of
the position of MNCs in international law.
This Article is organized into seven major sections. Section 2
focuses on the resource curse generally. Subsection 2.1 thereof is a
theoretical discussion of the resource curse thesis that surveys the
current literature on the phenomenon. Subsection 2.2 looks at
ideas advanced by economists and political scientists on the causes
of the resource curse. Subsection 2.3 examines the role of institu-
tions as an independent or explanatory variable for the low level of
growth in resource-rich countries.
Section 3 discusses the resource curse in Africa, focusing pri-
marily on African countries that produce or export oil in significant
quantities. Occasional references are made to African countries in-
volved in the production and export of other resources such as
copper and diamonds.
Section 4 looks at the World Bank Group and MNCs. MNCs
have been implicated in a number of practices linked to the re-
source curse, such as conflicts and civil wars. The World Bank
Group has played a key role in oil and gas projects across the
globe. This Section discusses the World Bank and MNCs in light of
their growing interest in addressing the resource curse.
Section 5 examines two of the ideas being presented as a cure
for the resource curse, namely national trust funds and information
disclosure. The examination of national trust funds will be in the
context of a recent application of the idea in Africa - the Chad-
Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project. The trust fund established under
this project is analyzed and its strengths and weaknesses are high-
lighted. Disclosure of corporate payments to governments as a
valuable tool for preventing or reversing the resource curse is also
discussed. Two prominent efforts in that regard - the EITI and the
PWYP Campaign-will be closely examined. The availability of
information regarding payments made by corporations to mineral-
producing countries will promote transparency and help the cause
of public accountability.
As useful as these two ideas may be, strong impediments such
as state sovereignty and the absence of real regulation of MNCs
present formidable challenges to their implementation in Africa.
In the absence of a governing structure to which all MNCs are sub-
ject, those who decide to be uncooperative may gain a competitive
advantage over those who choose to conform to higher standards
such as transparency in their transactions. This serves as a deter-
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rent to the latter group of companies, as the situation on the
ground already indicates. In the case of sovereignty, where gov-
ernment officials are not enamored of efforts to constrain their un-
accountable practices, they usually resort to sovereignty as a con-
venient excuse. 7 The perplexing question that emerges is what the
next line of action should be where there is a misalignment be-
tween the interests of the people and the harmful wishes of a sov-
ereignty-hugging political clan. Section 6 discusses corporate regu-
lation in international law and the concept of sovereignty.
Section 7 discusses the role the World Bank and MNCs can
play in further addressing the resource curse in the face of-or re-
gardless of -the identified obstacles. One useful mechanism is
sub-national or local trust funds instituted and funded by these en-
tities. The need for local trust funds to serve as veritable comple-
ments to national trust funds, or as viable alternatives where na-
tional trust funds are infeasible due to political and practical
constraints, cannot be overemphasized. Section 8 is the conclusion.
2. THE RESOURCE CURSE PHENOMENON
2.1. Concept
One of the most puzzling and perplexing discoveries of mod-
em scholarship is a paradoxical phenomenon referred to as the re-
source curse.8 The resource curse thesis posits that there exists a
negative relationship between endowment with natural resources
and social and economic development. Countries that have depos-
its of natural resources in abundant quantities have exhibited a
gnawing tendency to perform worse than those not similarly en-
dowed on virtually every social and economic indicator. 9
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner note that this paradox "has
7 See Arvind Ganesan, Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil
Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights, 16 HuM. RTs. WATCH 1, 48-51
(Jan. 2004) (detailing how the Angolan government rebuffed efforts by the IMF to
reconcile the country's oil-backed loans with information in the external debt da-
tabase on the basis of infringement on national sovereignty), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/angola0104.pdf.
8 Alan Heston, Crusades and Jihads: A Long-run Economic Perspective, 588
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 112, 126 (2003) ("What has been discovered in
the past fifty years is that the blessings of natural resources can be a curse in dis-
guise.").
9 See generally ALAN GELB & ASSOCIATES, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE?
passim (1988) (studying the impact of oil windfalls on countries with different eco-
nomic and social attributes).
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been a constant motif of economic history." 10 Paul Stevens ob-
serves that "[c]oncern over the impact of great wealth on a society
goes back at least as far as the writing of the fourteenth century
Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun in which he identifies the fifth stage
of the 'state' as one of waste and squandering."" In the 17th cen-
tury, although Spain had silver and gold flowing in abundance
from the colonies, it still had a weak economy compared with the
Netherlands, which was resource poor.' 2 The 19th and 20th centu-
ries saw the rise of the Swiss and Japanese economies while re-
source-rich Russia lagged behind.13 In more recent times, resource-
poor countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore
have been able to build strong economies at the same time that
their resource rich counterparts like Mexico, Nigeria, and Vene-
zuela have been beset with economic calamities. 14
This sad development, while a ubiquitous feature in many re-
source-rich economies, is particularly evident in the petroleum-
producing countries. Terry Lynn Karl provides the following de-
scription of what she refers to as oil's "paradox of plenty":
Countries that are dependent on petroleum revenues for
their livelihood (with the notable exception of Norway) are
among the most economically troubled, the most authori-
tarian, and/or the most conflict-ridden in the world. This is
true across regions-in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and
Latin America. Oil-exporting countries grow more slowly
than non-oil rich countries over time (between 1965-1980
OPEC members experienced an average decrease in their
per capita GNP of 1.3 per cent per year, while their non-oil
counterparts grew by an average of 2.2 per cent per year),
and they diversify their economies less easily. They have
unusually high poverty rates compared with countries de-
pendent on the export of agricultural products. Their infant
mortality, malnutrition, and life expectancy at birth is
worse than in non-oil/mineral dependent countries of the
10 JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. WARNER, NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (Harv. Inst. for Int'l Dev., Development Discussion Pa-
per No. 517a, 1995).
11 Stevens, supra note 4, at 5.
12 SACHS & WARNER, supra note 10, at 2
13 Id.
14 Id. at 2-3.
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same income level. Their health care and their school en-
rolment tend to be less than in their non-resource rich coun-
terparts; OPEC countries spend less than 4 per cent of their
GNP on education compared with almost 5 per cent for the
world as a whole (1997 figures). But they are more likely to
spend from two to ten times more on their militaries and to
be ruled by authoritarian leaders. The localities surround-
ing oil installations are among the most environmentally
damaged and conflict-ridden in the world. Worst of all, the
probability of having civil wars is higher in oil-exporting
countries than in their resource-poor counterparts.
This is oil's "paradox of plenty" and it is not a pretty pic-
ture.15
Although doubts have been raised about the existence of this
phenomenon, 16 the evidence supporting the prevalence of the re-
source curse seems to be strong.17 Empirical evidence provides
some of the strongest support. An analysis of the impact of min-
eral and other resource exports on GDP in ninety-seven countries
from 1971-1989 showed the inverse relationship between resource
abundance and rapid economic growth. Likewise, scholars have
shown a link between higher mineral and oil dependence and a
high level of poverty, disproportionate military expenditures by
governments, and a higher level of authoritarianism. Corruption is
higher and the probability of civil-war is also greater in countries
dependent on oil and minerals.'8
It should be noted that the existence of the resource curse is not
15 Terry Lynn Karl, The Oil Trap, TRANSPARENCY INT'L Q. NEwSL. (Transpar-
ency Int'l, Berlin, Germany), Sept. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.Transparenc
y.org/newsletters/2003.3/tiq-sept2003.pdf.
16 See Graham A. Davis, Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the
Mineral Economies, 23 WORLD DEv. 1765, 1776 (1995) (suggesting that "the resource
curse is, if anything, the exception rather than the rule").
17 See KYM ANDERSON, ARE RESOURCE-ABUNDANT ECONOMIES DISADVANTAGED?
3 (Ctr. for Int'l Econ. Studies Seminar Paper 97-03, 1997) ("Empirical evidence sug-
gests that economies well endowed with natural resources relative to other factors
of production have grown slower than other economies over the long term."),
available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/sp9703.pdf.
18 THOMAS I. PALLEY, COMBATING THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE WITH CITIZEN
REVENUE DISTRIBUTION FUNDS: OIL AND THE CASE OF IRAQ 3 (Foreign Policy in Focus,
FPIF Special Report, Dec. 2003), available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/
SRordf2003.pdf.
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a law cast in stone, as countries can take initiatives to check it.19
Yet the extent of its existence presents sufficient cause for pause
and bewilderment. First, it appears to cut across virtually every
barrier. Countries that have little or nothing in common ethnically,
geographically, culturally, or politically still seem to face the same
predicament.20 Second, it is counter-intuitive. 21 Both common
sense and economic theory present bases to believe that more re-
sources should be a blessing, not a curse.22 The presence of natural
resources in commercial quantities leads to the generation of val-
ued foreign exchange, brings in investors from other parts of the
world with much needed capital and increases the chances of pro-
ducing goods in view of the availability of raw materials.23 Indeed,
"few people would argue that more income is a bad thing. Stan-
dard economic theory asserts that one can never be made worse off
by a positive wealth effect." 24
In decades past, some prominent economic theorists stridently
argued that low growth in developing countries may be linked to a
lack of access to the necessary capital for development. The "staple
theory" of growth maintained that countries rich in oil and mineral
resources may be able to overcome this predicament by attracting
foreign companies to exploit these resources. Money generated
from a growing extractive sector would then be used in the con-
struction of needed infrastructure and in the establishment of sec-
ondary industries and diversification. 25 In a similar vein, the "big
19 See Richard M. Auty, Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly Industrializ-
ing Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis, 22 WORLD DEV. 11, 24 (1994) (explaining
that resource-rich countries can combat the resource curse with good industriali-
zation policy choices).
20 TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES,
at xv-xvI (1997).
21 See ERLING ROED LARSEN, ARE RICH COUNTRIES IMMUNE TO THE RESOURCE
CURSE? EVIDENCE FROM NORWAY'S MANAGEMENT OF ITS OIL RICHES 1 (Statistics
Norway, Discussion Paper No. 362, 2003) (stating that "[g]rowth studies show,
counter to intuition, that the discovery of a natural resource may be a curse rather
than a blessing since resource-rich countries grow slower than others"), available at
http://www.ssb.no/publikasjoner/DP/pdf/dp362.pdf.
22 See Stevens, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that some countries have man-
aged to avoid the "resource curse" and because of their success, can consider large
revenues from natural resources to be a "blessing").
23 MARIA SARRAF & MOORTAZA JIWANJI, BEATING THE RESOURCE CURSE: THE
CASE OF BOTSWANA 3 (World Bank Env't Dep't, Environmental Economics Series
Paper No. 83, 2001).
24 Id. at 1.
25 MICHAEL Ross, EXTRACTIVE SECTORS AND THE POOR 6 (Oxfam America, Re-
search Paper, Oct. 2001), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsand
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push" theory of economic development made the case that what
developing countries needed was to expand demand in large
measures to provide the needed encouragement for private corpo-
rations to make an investment in industrialization. 26 With the mas-
sive infusion of capital from resource exports, a more propitious
opportunity for the validation of these theories could not have ar-
rived. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case. Poor
countries with considerable endowment of resources have not es-
caped their pre-resource-discovery miseries. If anything, resources
have exacerbated their already pitiable conditions. This is another
piece of the puzzle.
In fairness to those who expect resource wealth to translate to
economic development, there is rich precedent for such optimism.
Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta seek to present a counterargu-
ment to the idea that resource abundance portends bad news for
economic growth by highlighting examples of countries that have
successfully utilized resources to achieve development.27 Petro-
leum and other resources contributed immensely to the emergence
of United States, Canada and Australia as strong economies. 28
Coal and hydrocarbons deposits played a fundamental role in the
success of the Industrial Revolution.29 Norway was the poorest
country in Europe in 1900, but is now one of the richest European
States primarily due to utilization of resources including oil.30 Bot-
swana has catapulted itself from one of the poorest countries at in-
dependence in 1965 to an upper income society through its dia-
mond mines.31
Karl, however, rejects the argument that the energy-influenced
development of yesteryear can be compared to the situation of oil
exporters today. She argues that "the oil-led development model
of today is significantly different from the role that energy played
publications/publications/researchjreports/art2635.html/pdfs/eireport.pdf.
26 Id.
27 Gavin Wright & Jesse Czelusta, Exorcizing the Resource Curse: Minerals as
a Knowledge Industry, Past and Present (July 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
28 See generally id. (describing the effect that petroleum and other resources
had on the respective economies of the United States, Canada, and Australia).
29 JEFFREY D. SACHS, TROPICAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT 18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8119, 2001).
30 SAVE THE CHILDREN, LIFTING THE RESOURCE CURSE: EXTRACTvE INDUSTRY,
CHILDREN AND GOVERNANCE 8 (2003), available at http://www.savethechildren.
org.uk/temp/scuk/cache/cmsattach/18_EITI.pdf.
31 Id. at 9.
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in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States, Can-
ada and Australia" because in those successful earlier experiences,
the contribution of mining to the overall economic input was quite
small, as opposed to the domineering position it occupies today in
the economies of oil-exporting nations.32 It should be noted, how-
ever, that resource-based economic growth and a bad press have
been companions for centuries now,33 a fact that tends to weaken
Karl's assertion. In the 18th century, Adam Smith wrote:
Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital em-
ployed in them, together with the ordinary profits of stock,
commonly absorb capital and stock. They are the projects,
therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver who
desired to increase the capital of his nation, would least
chuse to give any extraordinary encouragement .... 34
Thus, notwithstanding that centuries ago reliance on minerals
for economic development was the subject of strictures as it is to-
day, many countries, as indicated above, did not allow their natu-
ral resource wealth to truncate their march toward economic
growth. On the other hand, they used these resources as a spring-
board to propel them to the socioeconomic status that they enjoy
today.
Even if natural resource wealth does not confer a comparative
advantage, it is not expected to be a definite disadvantage. Again,
in line with the paradox, this hard to imagine scenario seems to be
the dominant trend socially, politically, and economically. "Oil
and mineral exports do not simply fail to alleviate poverty; they
appear to make it worse." 35 From a political perspective, evidence
from many studies indicates that there is a tendency for govern-
ments to become more democratic in the event of rising incomes.
However, a rise in incomes occasioned by oil wealth is said to lead
to a converse result: increasing oil wealth either reduces or evapo-
rates the democratization effect. Michael Ross contends that a
32 Terry Lynn Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political and Economic Conse-
quences, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 661, 662 (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004).
33 Wright & Czelusta, supra note 27, at 2.
34 ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 562 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1981) (1776), quoted in Wright & Czelusta,
supra note 27, at 2.
35 ROSS, supra note 25, at 5.
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component of the resource curse is that "oil and mineral wealth
tends to make states less democratic." 36
A recent study disputes the conclusion that oil wealth is more
closely linked with nonviability of regimes and political instability.
The countercontention, based on cross-sectional time series data
from 107 countries in the developing world between 1960 and
1999, is that "oil wealth is robustly associated with increased re-
gime durability, even when controlling for repression, and with
lower likelihoods of civil war and anti-state protest."37
An eclectic way of looking at it is to aver that the impact of oil
wealth on democracy may be two-sided. While it may be said that
oil wealth impedes democracy in some cases, there are also in-
stances where the flow of oil rents has helped undermine the sta-
bility of authoritarian regimes, such as that of the Iranian Shah,
who fell in 1979.38 In Venezuela, the presence of oil may have
played a major role in democratizing the country. 39
Furthermore, if the abundant flow of oil revenues or external
rents works against democracy, the converse claim may also hold:
The absence of massive flows of oil, or other external rents may
help or accelerate democratization. However, steep declines in oil
revenues and lower receipts of strategic rents have not always been
accompanied by a weakening of authoritarian institutions or en-
trenchment of democracy, especially in the Middle East.40 In some
cases, instead of oil wealth undermining regime viability, it may
actually enhance its durability. 41 This can be explained on the
ground that while oil wealth weakens state institutions, under cer-
tain conditions, it also can be a vehicle for constructing viable re-
36 Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 328
(2001).
37 Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World,
1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232 (2004).
38 Gary C. Gambill, Explaining the Arab Democracy Deficit: Part 1, 5 MIDDLE E.
INTELLIGENCE BULL. 37 (Feb.-Mar. 2003) ("According to some studies of Iran's
1979 revolution, oil wealth undermined the stability of the Shah's regime by fuel-
ing rapid socio-economic change."), at http://www.meib.org/articles/0302_me.
htm.
39 See id. ("[S]ome have argued that oil wealth contributed to democratization
in Venezuela.").
40 See id. (arguing that "had exogenous rent been a central foundation of au-
thoritarian governance in the Arab world, democratization would have advanced
much further than it has").
41 See Smith, supra note 37, at 232 (proposing that oil wealth has generally in-
creased the durability of regimes and that repression does not account for this
puzzling effect).
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gime coalitions and vibrant state institutions that prove useful in
maintaining the rule of leaders when they face the kinds of crises
that undercut other governments.
42
Finally, in view of the justifiable bewilderment occasioned by
the effect of resource wealth, it is pertinent to note that while re-
sources have not provided the needed engine for growth in many
resource-rich countries, lack of resources has not hindered re-
source-poor countries from rising to enviable heights in the arenas
of economic growth and social development. It can actually be ar-
gued that not having resources freed these countries from the
shackles that have been associated with resources. Unencumbered
by resource wealth, and propelled by the circumstances in which
they found themselves, they have been able to make their way to-
ward rapid growth. Yet this explanation, while plausible, does not
solve the paradox.
2.2. What Causes the Curse?
While there is hardly any question that the resource curse is a
reality, scholars in economics and political science have had a
much harder time explaining its causes both generally and as ap-
plied to specific countries. This prompted Hausmann and Rigobon
to observe: "[t]he concern that natural resource wealth may some-
how be inmiserating [sic] is a recurring theme in both policy dis-
cussions and in empirical analysis. The empirical regularity seems
to be in the data but understanding its causes has been a much
harder task."4
3
A variety of variables may account for the resource curse. Ex-
isting explanations can be categorized into three broad areas-
social, economic, and political. 44
42 Benjamin Smith, The Wrong Kind of Crisis: Why Oil Booms and Busts
Don't Lead to Democratic Transition 2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
43 RICARDO HAUSMANN & ROBERTO RIGOBON, AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
OF THE 'RESOURCE CURSE': THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9424, 2002) (footnotes omitted), available at http:
/ /www.nber.org/papers/w9424.pdf.
44 See Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD
POL. 297, 298 (1999) (discussing theories of the resource curse), available at
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/ faculty/ ross/paper.pdf. Ross, however, catego-
rizes what I refer to here as the "social explanation" under the political science ru-
bric of "cognitive explanations." I do not reject the validity of this categorization,
but believe that "cognitive explanations" are better suited for public actors, while
"social explanation" should be used for cases that cover the whole of society.
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2.2.1. Social Explanation
The social explanation is anchored by the premise that laziness
is concomitant with the abundance of natural resources. Several
centuries ago, the French scholar Jean Bodin opined that, "men of a
fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards;
whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by
necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious." 45
The aphorism, "necessity is the mother of invention," could
well explain this paradox. The fact that a number of resource-poor
countries have prospered far more than their resource-rich coun-
terparts tends to accentuate this point. However, it should also be
borne in mind that in the past, a number of countries have used
minerals and commodities as a foundation for their economic de-
velopment. Today, Norway's success in the management of its re-
sources tends to debunk the "laziness" myth.
2.2.2. Economic Explanations
Four major economic explanations for the negative correlation
between resource wealth and economic growth have been identi-
fied: "a decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities, the
instability of international commodity markets, the poor economic
linkages between resource and nonresource sectors, and an ailment
commonly known as the 'Dutch Disease."' 46
The first economic explanation is premised on the assumption
that the terms of trade are major determinants of economic growth.
If this premise is accepted, it stands to reason that when there is a
decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities, the result
may be a resource curse.47 However, the terms of trade effect,
while "statistically robust at the global level, . is still elusive at
the case-study level."48
The argument pertaining to the instability of international
commodity markets is that resource-dependent countries suffer
from the resource curse because of unstable commodity markets.
While the instability of export earnings from commodity exports is
hardly disputable, the issue is whether this necessarily translates
45 JEAN BODIN, SIx BooKs OF A COMMONWEALTH 5 (M. J. Tooley ed. & trans.,
1967).
46 Ross, supra note 44, at 298.
47 Id. at 303 ("[I]t may seem that a decline in the terms of trade for primary
commodities can account for much of the resource curse.").
48 Id. at 304.
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into something negative for the commodity exporters. Scholars
contend that this instability should actually lead to higher eco-
nomic growth by promoting unusually high levels of private in-
vestment, which exporters use as a way of protecting themselves
against future price shocks.49 "Yet even studies that find [that ex-
port instability] retards growth have so far been unable to link ex-
port instability to the resource curse."
50
The resource curse is also attributable to the fact that commod-
ity exports "generate little growth in other sectors of the econ-
omy. . . ."51 To solve this linkage problem, states have taken action
to nationalize their mineral and petroleum industries and have
adopted strong measures to capture the economic rents that MNCs
were repatriating to their home countries.52 Yet the resource curse
persists in these countries.
The Dutch Disease, which owes its origin to the experience of
the Netherlands with the discovery of North Sea natural gas in the
1960s, has two elements in its technical form.53 According to
economists, the first element is the spending effect. Natural re-
source booms tend to lead to appreciation in the real foreign ex-
change rate, driving spending to the nontradeable sector (e.g., con-
struction), which results in inflation. The second element is the
migration of labor and capital to the booming nontradeable sectors.
Both of these elements combine to render the non-boom-tradeable
sector (e.g., manufacturing and agriculture) less or non-
competitive and to effectively crowd out previously productive
sectors. Nigerian scholar Pat Utomi links the problems of the Ni-
gerian economy to the Dutch Disease. Utomi bases his position
principally on data that indicate that in the years that Nigerian oil
revenues dwindled (1987-1990), manufacturing boomed. The oil
windfalls of 1991 put an end to this progress and, with consistent
growth in oil revenues since 1999, Nigeria's economy has been in
the doldrums.5 4
49 Id. (citing ODIN KNUDSEN & ANDREW PARNES, TRADE INSTABILITY AND ECON-
OMIC DEVELOPMENT (1975)).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 305.
52 Id.
53 The general form associates the term with every conceivable malady occa-
sioned by resource abundance.
54 See Pat Utomi, Managing the Curse of Oil, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2003 (ar-
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It should be noted that while the Dutch Disease appeared to be
a promising explanation for the resource curse a few years ago, it
has been convincingly shown that it may not be as widespread as
earlier thought. States have a range of options to offset its impact,
if they consider the necessary course of action to take.55 These pol-
icy options include "maintaining tight fiscal policies, temporarily
subsidizing their agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and plac-




Political scientists have also advanced a number of theories as
to the underlying causes of the resource curse, and they fall into
three principal categories: cognitive explanations, societal explana-
tions, and statist explanations. 5
7
Cognitive explanations suggest that being rich in resources in-
duces myopia or extravagance in policy makers. Societal explana-
tions contend that where natural resources abound, members of
society favor policies that impede growth. Statist explanations
state the proposition that booms in resources have a tendency to
weaken state institutions.
Arguably, the leading state-centered argument is premised on
the rentier thesis. In a seminal article first published in 1970,
Hossein Mahdavy defined rentier states as "those countries that
receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent."5 8
External rents are "rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or
governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given
country."5 9 The basic feature of external rents is that they are re-
ceived without much input from the productive processes of the
domestic economy of the country receiving them. Based on this
conceptualization, Mahdavy includes oil revenues received by
governments of oil exporting countries in the definition of external
55 See Ross, supra note 44, at 305 ("More recent research suggests, however,
that [Dutch Disease] is less common in developing states than originally thought,
and that governments can usually offset its impact, should they feel it neces-
sary.").
56 Id. at 307.
57 Id. at 308.
58 H. Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier
States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST
428, 428 (M.A. Cook ed., 1970).
59 Id.
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rents.60 Karl concurs that. in general, "oil rents produce a rentier
state." 6
1
Mahdavy's definition of a rentier state has generally been ac-
cepted and adopted by other writers.62 Hazem Beblawi and Gia-
como Luciani, while supporting Mahdavy's idea of the rentier
state, rejected its underlying meaning.6 3 These scholars abandoned
an exclusive focus on the state in conceptualizing the issue, insist-
ing on an emphasis on the economy. Accordingly, they advanced
the concept of the "rentier economy" of which the rentier state is a
subset.64
According to Beblawi, there are four key features that are condi-
tio sine qua non for the characterization of a state as rentier.65 First,
there must be a dominance of rent situations in the economy.66
Second, the rent must originate from foreign sources or sources
60 Id. at 428-29.
61 Karl, supra note 32, at 663.
62 See; e.g., id. at 661 (defining a rentier state as "a state that lives from exter-
nally generated rents rather than from the surplus production of the population");
Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal, Prelude to the Resource Curse: Explaining Oil
and Gas Development Strategies in the Soviet Successor States and Beyond, 34 CoMP.
POL. STUD. 367, 368 (2001) (stating that a rentier state is "a state that primarily pro-
cures revenue from external sources and then redistributes it to the population as
a form of social and political control"); Jonathan Symons, NGOs in International
Organizations: Searching for Legitimacy in Global Governance 15 (unpublished
paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference,
University of Tasmania, Hobart, Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 2003) (noting that rentier states
are "states that are substantially financed through externally generated revenues
(such as those derived from oil) rather than extraction of the domestic popula-
tion's surplus production."), available at http://www.utas.edu.au/government/
APSA/JSymonsfinal.pdf; ISAM AL KHAFAJI, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, IN
SEARCH OF LEGITIMACY: THE POST-RENTIER IRAQI STATE, at para. 50 (defining the
rentier state "in its broadest sense as the regular dependence of a country on sub-
stantial amounts of external economic rents whose variations are not related to
changes in productivity or changes in inputs to the production process"), available
at http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/iraq/khafaji (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
63 Hazem Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani, Introduction, in 2 THE RENTIER STATE 1,
11 (Hazem Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani eds., 1987) ("A rentier state is then a sub-
system associated with a rentier economy"); see also DOUGLAS A. YATES, THE
RENTIER STATE IN AFRICA: OIL RENT DEPENDENCY AND NEOCOLONIALISM IN THE
REPUBLIC OF GABON 13 (1996) (explaining that Beblawi and Luciani "prefer instead
to define the concept of a 'rentier economy' of which rent plays a major role, and
in which that rent is external to the economy").'
64 YATES, supra note 63.
65 Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in THE RENTIER STATE,
supra note 63, at 49, 51-52.
66 Id.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss1/1
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that are external to the economy. 67 This excludes domestic rents,
even if they come in substantial and domineering numbers. Third,
only a tiny minority may participate in generating the rent.68 Thus,
where a majority of the citizens play an active role in the genera-
tion of rent, the economy is not rentier, even if rent situations (e.g.,
income from tourism) predominate. Fourth, the major recipient of
the external rent in the.economy must be the government.
69
Luciani's emphasis, on the other hand, is on the origins or
"sources" of the state revenue (that is, external versus internal) and
less on the nature or "structure" of the revenue (that is, rent versus
taxes).70 Luciani sees state autonomy -the freedom that rent pro-
vides the state from the need to extract income from the internal or
domestic economy- as a major impact of the rentier economy.
71
Where a government has no need for taxes from their citizens,
citizens lose the incentive to demand accountability of those who
spend the tax revenues. 72 The wealth of information that is gener-
ated by a vibrant tax bureaucracy is also lost, which means the loss
of a vital tool for social and economic planning.73 Moreover, de-
pendency on taxes from citizens to run the state would invite the
interest of political leaders to introduce wealth creation policies.
Where there is no need to tax because resource revenues are suffi-
cient to keep the machinery of government running, government
officials are not impelled to focus, on creating wealth that they can
eventually tax. 74 Karl, in what has been described as "the most
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see YATES, supra note 63, at 14 ("[Tlhe government must be the principal
recipient of the external rent in the economy.").
70 Giacomo Luciani, Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in
THE RENTIER STATE, supra note 63, at 63, 68-69 ("[I1t is essential that the income of
the state not only be in the nature of a rent, but also be earned abroad .... ").
71 Id. at 69 ("The essential impact of oil production and exports is that they
free the state from the need of raising income domestically."); see also YATES, supra
note 63, at 14-15 ("The key feature of a rentier state according to Luciani is that
external rent liberates the state from the need to extract income from the domestic econ-
omy.").
72 See KARL, supra note 20, at 172 ("[It was not surprising that the petro-state
failed to develop a trained cadre who could design tax systems .... ).
73 Id. at 91 (explaining how dependence on oil taxation caused the Venezue-
lan government to miss the opportunity to build a national administrative struc-
ture).
74 IMF Says Nigeria's Natural Resources is a Curse, THE PUNCH, Apr. 1, 2004 (cit-
ing the views of Xavier Sala-I-Martin), available at http://www.punchng.com
/business/article03/040401.
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ambitious comparative analysis of rentier states," 75 devotes ex-
traordinary attention to this question of the ability to extract taxes
from the citizens:
How these [resource-rich] states collect and distribute taxes,
in turn, creates incentives that pervasively influence the or-
ganization of political and economic life and shapes gov-
ernment preferences with respect to public policies. In this
manner, long-term efficiency in the allocation of resources
is either helped or hindered, and the diverse development
trajectories of nations are initiated, modified, or sustained.
76
The thrust of the argument is that the state could undergo an
evolution from an extractive one to a distributive one when oil
revenues begin to assume the status of the dominant source of
government revenue, leading to consequences that evidence the re-
source curse. 77
It should be mentioned, however, that " [uInlike economic ex-
planations, political explanations for the resource curse have been
criticized for the absence of careful hypothesis testing." 78
2.3. The Role of Institutions
Apart from the social, economic, and political explanations dis-
cussed above, institutions have been presented as a potential ex-
planation for the resource curse.79 A view has been advanced that
the resource factor is not necessarily at the root of the economic
malaise seen in a number of resource-rich countries. Instead, insti-
tutions determine levels of economic growth. Douglass North
broadly defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society
or, more formally, .... the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction." 80 Good institutions are believed to make all
75 Smith, supra note 37, at 233.
76 KARL, supra note 20, at 7.
77 Smith, supra note 37, at 233; see also Jacques Delacroix, The Distributive State
in the World System, 15 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV., Fall 1980, at 3, 11-14 (describing the
emergence of the distributive state).
78 YOuNKYOO KIM, THE RESOURCE CURSE IN A POST-COMMUNIST REGIME: RUSSIA
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVE 3 (2003).
79 Ross, supra note 44, at 310.
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the difference. According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
the concept of good institutions incorporates "constraints on gov-
ernment expropriation, independent judiciary, property rights en-
forcement, and institutions providing equal access to education
and ensuring civil liberties ... ."81 Rodrik's definition of good in-
stitutions includes a "regulatory apparatus curbing the worst
forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, and moral hazard, a
moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social coopera-
tion, [and] social and political institutions that mitigate risk and
manage social conflicts."8 2
The argument is that those countries that are growth losers suf-
fer from a deficit in institutions. Formal and informal institutions
are identified as pivotal to the growth process. Thus, Ross con-
tends that the inability of a state to "enforce property rights may
directly or indirectly lead to a resource curse."83 On the other
hand, if the right institutions are put in place, resources can actu-
ally constitute a blessing.84
The critical role of institutions in promoting economic devel-
opment has a strong scholarly Support. Brindley, drawing from
North, Thomas and Rodrik, summarizes the importance of institu-
tions:
While recognizing that the concept of institutions remains
somewhat ambiguous, their importance in supporting the
process of economic development is uncontentious. Coun-
tries that enforce private property rights, and protect their
citizens from too much government expropriation, will in-
vest more in human and physical capital and use these fac-
tors more efficiently.85
81 Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1370 n.3 (2001).
82 DANI RODRIK, INSTITUTIONS FOR HIGH-QUALITY GROWTH: WHAT THEY ARE
AND HOW TO ACQUIRE THEM 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7540, 2000).
83 Ross, supra note 44, at 298.
84 HALVOR MEHLUM ET AL., INSTITUTIONS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 13 (Dep't of
Econ., Univ. of Oslo, Memorandum No. 29/2002, 2002), available at
http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo/memopdf/memo2902.pdf.
85 DAMIAN BRINDLEY, DISEASE, INSTITUTIONS AND'ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10
(Sch. of Econ., Univ. of N.S.W., Working Paper Series No. 2003/7, 2003), available
at http://www.docs.fce.unsw.edu.au/economics/research/workingpapers/2003
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The fact that a number of growth winners like Norway, Bot-
swana, Canada, and Australia have been able to thrive in spite of,
or with the benefit of, their natural resource endowments seems to
strengthen this argument.
86
Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi ex-
amine the factors that determine income levels around the world.
Employing recently developed instruments for institutions and
trade, they look at geography (which is a major determinant of
such things as climate and endowment of natural resources), inter-
national trade, and institutions. The major conclusion from their
study is that "the quality of institutions 'trumps' everything else."
87
They further state that after controlling for institutions, the impact
of measures of geography on incomes are "at best weak."88 A simi-
lar conclusion is made in relation to trade, the direct effects of
which are considered insignificant. 89
Looking at Nigeria's socio-economic malaise and political pre-
dicament despite years of being a major oil exporter, Xavier Sala-i-
Martin and Arvind Subramanian explain this problem in terms of
"stunted institutional development" 90 and contend that "[w]aste
and corruption from oil rather than Dutch Disease has been re-
sponsible for [Nigeria's] poor long run economic performance." 91
Rodrik and others also raise a crucial point about the contribu-
tion of resources to the deficiency or the poor quality of institu-
tions. Their position is that geographical factors, including natural
resource endowments, "have a strong indirect effect [on incomes]
by influencing the quality of institutions." 92 Sachs and Warner,
who see the impact of resource abundance on institutional quality
as at most weak, reject the contention that the abundance of re-
sources only causes deterioration in institutions. 93 The Sachs-
_07.pdf.
86 Id.
87 DANI RODRIK ET AL., INSTITrTIONS RULE: THE PRIMACY OF INSTITUTIONS OVER
GEOGRAPHY AND INTEGRATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, abstract (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9305, 2002).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 SALA-I-MARTIN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 5, at 2.
91 Id., abstract.
92 RODRIK ET AL., supra note 87, abstract.
93 See MEHLUM, supra note 84, at 14 (stating that because Sachs and Warner
"dismiss one rent-seeking mechanism by showing that there is at most a weak
impact of resource abundance on instituti6nal'quality . . . resource abundance
does not cause a deterioration of institutions"); see also JEFFREY D. SACHS,
[Vol. 26:1
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Warner position is believed to enjoy lesser empirical support.94
3. THE RESOURCE CURSE IN AFRICA
The resource curse in Africa is not limited to the oil and gas
sector. This fact is illustrated by the famous remarks of former
Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda: "We are in part to blame,
INSTITUTIONS DON'T RULE: DIRECT EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY ON PER CAPITA INCOME 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9490, 2003) (questioning the
conclusions of Acemoglu et al., Easterly and Levine, and Rodrik et al., and noting
that:
[Miany of the reasons why geography seems to have affected institu-
tional choices in the past (e.g. the suitability of locations for European
technologies, the disease environment and risks to survival of immi-
grants, the productivity of agriculture, the transport costs between far-
flung regions and major markets) are indeed based on direct effects of
geography on production systems, human health, and environmental
sustainability, and many of those very same channels would still be
likely to apply today").
94 See OLA OLSSON, GEOGRAPHY AND INSTITUTIONS: A REvIEw OF PLAUSIBLE AND
IMPLAUSIBLE LINKAGES (Dep't of Econ., Goteborg Univ., Working Papers in Eco-
nomics No. 106, 2003), available at http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/000
02978/01/gunwpe0106.pdf.
Proponents of the third and perhaps most subtle hypothesis argue that
institutions like private property rights, free trade, and the rule-of-law
are the primary determinants of levels of economic development. How-
ever, the quality of a society's institutions is in turn strongly influenced
by its geography. Climate, topography, geology, and biogeography all
contribute to mould [sic] the rules that societies live by. Most of the ma-
jor research efforts during the last two or three years have focussed [sic]
on this connection and has [sic] shown that it appears to be the one that
has the greatest empirical support.
Id. at 2 (citations omitted); see also DARON ACEMOGLU ET AL., REVERSAL OF FORTUNE:
GEOGRAPHY AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD INCOME
DISTRIBUTION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8460, 2001)
(hypothesizing that institutional reversal, not geographic factors, account for de-
crease in societal wealth); WILLIAM EASTERLY & ROSS LEVINE, TROPICS, GERMS AND
CROPS: How ENDOWMENTS INFLUENCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9106, 2002) (finding evidence that tropics,
germs, and crops affect development through institutions); Acemoglu et al., supra
note 81 (comparing the European development of institutions, and the effects of
institutions on income per capita, to Africa). However, Brindley rejects the views
of Acemoglu, Rodrik, and others while offering support to Sachs' position:
The evidence presented in this paper comes out on the side of Sachs and
his co-authors, as it suggests that geographical factors do have a direct
influence on levels of economic development beyond their effect on insti-
tutions. It is argued that while the role of institutions should be in no
way diminished, it is not the entire story.
BRINDLEY, supra note 85, at 2.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our
mouths."95
However, African oil exporters present the most fitting illustra-
tion and telling confirmation of the resource curse. A closer look at
many of the oil producing countries reveals some of the basic
symptoms of the resource curse in varying degrees. There is a rea-
sonable apprehension that this malady, absent an effective remedy,
will extend to the newer entrants in the oil industry. As some
commentators have observed, "Africa's older oil exporters -
Nigeria, Gabon and Angola -confirm this trend while newer ex-
porters, such as Equatorial Guinea, seem about to embark on the
same course."9
6
Nigeria is the largest oil producing nation in Africa,97 the sixth
largest oil producer in the world,98 the fifth largest producer in the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"),99
and the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States.100 Since the
mid-1970s, Nigeria has earned enormous amounts of money from
oil production and export, yet it is one of the poorest countries in
the world. Nearly seventy percent of Nigeria's population live be-
low the World Bank's and the United Nations' ("U.N.") designated
poverty line -subsisting on less than one dollar per day. 01 Ironi-
cally, the rural communities which produce about seventy-five
percent of Nigeria's petroleum are among the poorest in the nation.
The socio-economic and political predicament of Nigeria is
95 Ross, supra note 44, at 297.
96 IAN GARY & TERRY LYNN KARL, BOTTOM OF THE BARREL: AFRICA'S OIL BOOM
AND THE POOR 77 (2003).
97 See Famine as Government Policy, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2004, § 1, at 20 ("[An-
gola] is the second largest producer of oil in Africa after Nigeria .... ").
98 Jonathan Power, Nigeria Struggles Against the Curse of Oil, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2004, at 6.
99 ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES ("OPEC"), OPEC
ANN. STAT. BULL. 2003, at 13, available at http://www.opec.org/Publications/AB/
pdf/AB002003.pdf.
100 Mark Mazzetti, Pax Americana, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 6, 2003, at
37; see also Dep't of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs: Nigeria ("Nigeria. . . was the
5th largest supplier of crude oil to the United States in 2003."), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nigeria.html.
101 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RIVERS AND BLOOD: GUNS, OIL AND POWER IN
NIGERIA'S RIVERS STATE 6 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/af-
rica/nigeria02O5/nigeriaO2O5.pdf; Allan H. Meltzer, The World Bank One Year





THE RESOURCE CURSE IN AFRICA
breathtaking in its misery considering that Nigeria is estimated to
have earned up to $320 billion from crude oil exports between 1970
and 1999,102 enough to be able to improve the economic situation of
the people and address the lingering issues at the core of conflicts
and crises within the country. The rate at which poverty is grow-
ing among the 123 million Nigerians is alarming. According to the
Federal Office of Statistics in Nigeria, poverty has increased from
twenty-eight percent of the population in 1980, to forty-six percent
in 1985, to sixty-six percent in 1996.103 It seems paradoxical that in
a country so rich in oil reserves, whose production accounts for
ninety percent of the country's income, that its development and
infrastructure could be so poor. According to the World Bank,
"Nigeria has been characterised as a country of 'poverty amid
plenty.'" 104
Oil production in Nigeria is primarily a joint venture between
multinational oil corporations (including ExxonMobil, Royal
Dutch/Shell, ChevronTexaco, and TotalFinaElf which partially
fund the development process) and the Nigerian government,
which has rights to all mineral resources in the country.105 While
these entities have profited handsomely from the extraction busi-
ness, the remainder of the country, particularly the oil producing
areas, has suffered on many fronts. Corruption is pervasive in the
country, and those living in oil-affected communities suffer from
102 Integrated Regional Information Networks, U.N. Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs, Nigeria: Focus on the Scourge of Poverty (June 11, 2002),
available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28258.
103 See id. (stating that surveys conducted by Nigeria's Federal Office of Sta-
tistics indicate that while twenty-eight percent of Nigerians lived in poverty in
1980, the level of poverty increased substantially over the years, with sixty-six
percent of Nigerians living in poverty, subsisting on less than $1.40 a day, in 1996).
104 Bello Umar & Hamza Kankiya, Beyond the Poverty Alleviation Programmes:
Toward a New Framework for Managing Natural Resources in Nigeria 2 (unpublished
paper presented at the Conference on Tropical and Subtropical Agricultural and
Natural Resource Management ("Deutscher Tropentag"), Berlin, Oct. 5-7, 2004),
available at http://www.tropentag.de/2004/abstracts/full/100.pdf.
105 Nigeria is gradually moving away from participation joint ventures and
toward production sharing contracts. This move is considered beneficial to both
the government and the oil corporations since the government was always having
difficulty coming up with its own part of the investment costs required under the
joint ventures. Under the production sharing contracts, the oil companies invest
in the exploration without government support and, if there is commercial dis-
covery, they recover their investments as well as a share in the crude oil that is
produced during the life of the contract. See generally Mirian Kene Omalu, Devel-
opments in Petroleum Exploration and Production Arrangements in Nigeria, OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N REV. 70, 70 (1996).
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human rights abuse.
Gabon has been producing oil since the late 1960s. Despite the
oil wealth that has poured into government coffers for over thirty
years, Gabon is still unable to provide a decent standard of living
for its small population of 1.3 million people. Gabon has experi-
enced economic stagnation 06 and is said to suffer from the Dutch
Disease.107 The country's dictatorial ruler, Omar Bongo, has been
in power since 1968 and is known for his lavish spending. 108
Plagued by corruption and heavily burdened with foreign debt,
the government has a dismal poverty reduction record. 109
Angola and Congo-Brazzaville not only "show the same prob-
lems as the older producers," but also have the additional burden
of long drawn-out civil wars."0 Although Angola's oil reserves in-
creased four-fold in the 1990s alone and overall oil production has
been considerable, the country's level of poverty has hardly im-
proved. The country ranks low on the U.N. Human Development
Index,"' and its average life expectancy of forty-five years is thirty
percent lower than that of most developing countries. The level of
corruption is amazing. According to the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), billions of dollars went missing from the country's
coffers between 1997 and 2002.112 To worsen matters, the govern-
ment continues to take out loans backed by its oil reserves, thereby
further endangering its fiscal position. 113 These loans generally
have not been used for the benefit, of the country, but rather to en-
rich the country's political leaders. In early 2002, a magistrate in
Switzerland, upon sensing some irregularities, froze more than
$700 million in bank deposits that had been linked to oil-backed
106 See YATES, supra note 63 (laying out a definition for a "rentier" state and
discussing its economic troubles).
107 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 29.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 30.
110 Id. at 31.
111 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 142
(2004) (ranking Angola 166th out of 177 countries), available at http://hdr.
undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdrO4_HDI.pdf.
112 See Ganesan, supra note 7, at 33 ("The IMF concluded that from 1997-2002,
the Angolan government could not account for about U.S. $4.2 billion in expendi-
tures ....").
113 See GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 33 ("In 1999, the IMF estimated that oil-
backed debt was estimated at 33 percent of Angola's total external debt, now
thought to be over $11 billion.").
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loans.114
In Congo-Brazzaville, the government is reportedly too closely
tied to the leading oil company, Elf Aquitaine (now part of Total-
FinaElf), to bargain effectively to the benefit of its citizens. Because
of this, the government has not been able to jump-start its devel-
opment. The country has a huge amount of oil-backed debt, and
poverty is growing." 5 More than seventy percent of the popula-
tion of this resource-rich country lives on less than one dollar per
day and half do not have access to clean water."
6
Equatorial Guinea seems to be following the dangerous exam-
ple of its neighbors. The President is currently consolidating
power and concentrating it in himself and his relatives. Newly ac-
quired wealth is being used to support authoritarian rule in the
country. "According to human rights organizations and interna-
tional observers, the country Jbas a history marked by extreme lev-
els of repression, human rights violations, rigged elections and lit-
tle transparency or accountability."" 7 Fiscal mismanagement and
corruption are the order of the day. The increases in government
revenue have not been accompanied by any "appreciable im-
provement in [the] lives of most citizens of the country.""
8
Observers have also expressed concern about Sao Tome, an
emerging oil-producing country; in July 2003, a coup attempt
against the government of President Fradique de Menezes was
linked to expected oil revenues." 9
4. THE WORLD BANK, MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS, AND
AFRICA'S RESOURCE CURSE
This Section discusses the World Bank and MNCs, and their
contributions to the perpetration, perpetuation, and amelioration
of the resource curse, particularly in Africa.
114 Ganesan, supra note 7, at 50-51 (discussing the circumstances surrounding
the judge's decision).
115 See GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 34-38 (discussing Congo-Brazzaville's
myriad problems).
116 Id. at 37.
117 Id. at 39.
118 Id. at 41.
119 Nicholas Shaxson, Pain or Gain? Crunch Time Looms for Sao Tome Oil,
REuTERS, Dec. 23, 2003 ("No one was hurt, but the putsch revealed a streak of an-
ger at the government for signing what the coup plotters regarded as flawed ex-
ploration contracts.").
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4.1. The World Bank
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the "IBRD"),1 20 the International Development Association (the
"IDA"),121 the International Finance Corporation (the "IFC"), 122 the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
"ICSID"),1 23 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(the "MIGA") 124 compose the World Bank Group. Within the
World Bank Group, the World Bank comprises the IBRD and the
IDA, while the IFC, ICSID, and MIGA are affiliates of the World
Bank. A more restrictive categorization reserves the name "World
Bank" for the IBRD only.
When the IBRD was established in 1944, its mission was to re-
construct the war-torn economies of Europe after the Second
World War. Over time, and especially after the introduction of the
Marshall Plan in 1947, the World Bank Group's purposes shifted to
(and now center on) "the promotion of economic growth, invest-
ment and stability in less-developed countries [("LDCs")], and the
improvement of living and working standards in those coun-
tries."'125
According to Ibrahim Shihata, former Vice President and Gen-
eral Counsel of the World Bank, the purposes of the World Bank
120 See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended as 16 U.S.T.
1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294 (Dec. 17, 1965) (establishing the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (the "IBRD")).
121 See Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association,
Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 (establishing the International De-
velopment Association (the "IDA")).
122 See Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, May
25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force July 20, 1956) (estab-
lishing the International Finance Corporation (the "IFC")).
123 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (en-
tered into force Oct. 14, 1966) (establishing the International Center for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID")).
124 See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 12089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 (establishing the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (the "MIGA")), available at http://
www.miga.org/screens/about/convent/convent.htm.
125 Mark E. Wadrzyk, Is It Appropriate for the World Bank to Promote Democratic
Standards in a Borrower Country?, 17 WIs. INT'L L.J. 553, 553 (1999); see also Halim
Moris, The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable Partnership or Mismatched




THE RESOURCE CURSE IN AFRICA
include alleviating poverty 126 and fulfilling such basic needs as
clean water, education, healthcare, housing, and environmental
protection. 127 While the IBRD's sphere of influence extends to
middle-income countries, 128 the IDA concentrates on providing
subsidized loans (known as "credits"), technical assistance, and
policy advice to the least-developed states,129 some of whom are
unable to attract the attention of, or obtain favorable borrowing
terms from, the international financial markets. Indeed, the World
Bank is "one of the world's largest sources of funding for the de-
veloping world." 130
The IFC provides debt and equity financing for private-sector
projects in developing countries. The MIGA insures private inves-
tors against noncommercial risks in politically volatile environ-
ments, while the ICSID settles investment disputes between pri-
vate investors and their host states.
The World Bank Group has been involved for a considerable
period of time in oil, gas, and mining projects in different parts of
the world. Since 1992, the Bank has approved $18.5 billion for oil,
gas, and coal projects in twenty-five developing countries, includ-
ing Bolivia, Brazil, Bosnia, Guatemala, Russia, Trinidad and To-
bago.131
Its involvement in some of these projects has resulted in strong
criticisms against the World Bank's participation. The Bank, par-
ticularly the IFC, is seen as being profit-driven when it ventures
into such lucrative sectors as oil and gas financing, which assures
126 Poverty alleviation became a major guiding principle for the Bank under
President McNamara. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
13 (2002) ("Touched by the poverty that he saw throughout the Third World,
McNamara had redirected the Bank's effort at its elimination....").
127 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the
Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 40 (1988).
128 Middle-income countries are countries with per capita income of less than
$5,185 a year. "Seventy-five percent of the world's poorest people ... live in these
countries .... " WORLD BANK GROUP, WORKING FOR A WORLD FREE OF POVERTY 18
(2003).
129 Least-developed countries are countries with annual per capita income of
$875 or less. See id. at 19 (discussing the World Bank's lending policies).
130 Id. at 1.
131 See Heather Turcotte, Slippery Security: National, International and Global
Security Issues within Petroleum Production, 1 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. INT'L REL.
109, 133 (2002) (detailing the extent of the World Bank's involvement in funding
for oil production), available at http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volumel/
number4/heatherpdf.pdf.
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better returns on investment.132 The Bank has also been excoriated
for ignoring human rights and environmental concerns surround-
ing some projects or the host countries for these projects, thereby
exacerbating the already bad situation or undermining any im-
provement from the Bank's participation.
In response to some of these criticisms, the Bank instituted an
Extractive Industries Review in 2001.133 The Review, chaired by
Dr. Emil Salim, former Minister of Environment of Indonesia,
submitted its final report entitled Striking a Better Balance in Janu-
ary 2004."3 It recommended, among other things, that the World
Bank should phase out oil investments by 2008 and concentrate on
investments aimed at developing renewable energy resources,
emissions-reducing projects, and clean energy technology. 135 The
African Mineral and Energy Ministers and a group of investment
banks have voiced strong objections to the recommendations.
36
The World Bank is unlikely to endorse most of these recommenda-
tions.
4.2. Multinational Corporations
The term MNC is sometimes used interchangeably with such
other terms as transnational corporation ("TNC") and multina-
tional enterprise ("MNE").137 Different definitions of the term ex-
132 See id. at 130 (arguing that the Bank involved itself in money-making poli-
cies even if it didn't primarily benefit communities).
133 See Extractive Industries Review ("EIR"), What is the EIR? (explaining that
the aim of the group is "to produce a set of recommendations that will guide the
involvement of. the World Bank Group in the oil, gas, and mining sectors"), at
http://www.eireview.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
134 See Letter from Dr. Emil Salim to James D. Wolfensohn, President, World
Bank Group (Jan. 12, 2004) (on file with author).
135 See WORLD BANK GROUP, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE-THE WORLD BANK
GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRAcTIVE
INDUSTRIES REvIEw (Sept. 17, 2004) (outlining the World Bank's future involvement
in the extractive industries), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ogmc/
files/ finaleirmanagementresponseexecsum.pdf.
136 See Nicole Itano, Proposal to Limit Oil and Coal Projects Draws Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at W1 (discussing objections to the World Bank's recommen-
dations to limit oil and coal projects to protect the environment); Demetri Sevas-
topulo, Banks Contest Ban Proposed for Coal and Oil Extraction, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2004, at 6 (detailing a request by twenty-one banks, which comprise the so-called
Equator banks, who do not want the World Bank to adhere to the Extraction In-
dustries Review recommendations).
137 This portion of the Article draws heavily from EMEKA A. DURUIGBO,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2003), particularly the introduc-
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ist.138 Peter Muchlinski explains that economists define an MNC as
an entity that "owns (in whole or in part), controls and manages
income generating assets in more than one country." 139 To Phillip
Blumberg, they are affiliated Corporations that are incorporated in
different jurisdictions but are conducting a common enterprise un-
der common control. 40 However, as with many other concepts
that do not lend themselves to an easy definition, no universally
accepted definition of MNCs exists.' 41 For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, MNCs are defined as large corporations that have business
operations in one or more countries apart from the country of their
incorporation either directly or through subsidiaries and affiliates.
For decades, MNCs, as well as state-run oil corporations, have
dominated world oil development.142 Almost since the inception of
commercial oil production in 1859 in Pennsylvania, 143 through the
period after the two World Wars, and even up to present times, the
overarching role of MNCs in this area has been an ever-present fea-
ture. 144
tory chapter and chapter 4.
138 For a variety of definitions of the terms MNC, TNC and MNE, see David
Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
901, 907-09 (2003).
139 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12 (1995).
140 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY'vii. (1993).
141 See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8296.10 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2002); see also Alejo Jose G.
Sison, When Multinational Corporations Act as Governments: The Mobil Corporation
Experience, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 166, 166 (Jorg Andriof &
Malcolm McIntosh eds., 2001) ("Strangely, there is no agreed definition for a 'mul-
tinational corporation.'").
142 MICHELLE LEIGHTON ET AL., BEYOND GOOD DEEDS: CASE STUDIES AND A NEW
POLICY AGENDA FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 26-27 (2002), available at
http://www.n-h-i.org/Publications/Publications.html.
143 The origin of the petroleum industry is generally associated with Colonel
E. Drake's discovery of petroleum in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Zhiguo
Gao, Public Participation in Mining and Petroleum in Asia and the Pacific: The Ok Tedi
Case and its Implications, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY
RESOURCES 679, 679 n.1 (Donald N. Zillman et al. eds., 2002).
144 See LEIGHTON ET AL., supra note 142, at 27-28 (detailing the power of Stan-
dard Oil before its dissolution in 1911, the strategic partnerships negotiated by the
governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to gain access
to Middle East oil reserves, the post-World War II dominance of the "Seven Sis-
ters" (Exxon, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Gulf, British Petroleum,
and Royal Dutch/Shell), the formation of OPEC, and the emergence of smaller
and independent oil companies operating in different parts of the world).
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MNCs are key actors and players of consequence in the inter-
national field today, and it would be impossible to speak of inter-
national trade and investment without them.145 MNCs in the oil
and gas sector particularly stand out. According to the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") in its
World Investment Report 2002, ExxonMobil (the world's largest oil
company), Royal Dutch/Shell, BP, ChevronTexaco, and TotalFina
Elf are among the world's top twenty-five MNCs in terms of for-
eign assets. 14
6
While this species of corporate entities has been experiencing a
steady growth in size, power, and influence, 147 its phenomenal
growth148 has come with immense social, environmental, and eco-
nomic costs to humanity. Thus, while due credit is given to the
positive contributions of MNCs in such areas as job creation 149 and
new technologies, 5 0 there has been growing concern regarding the
145 Id. at 2-3.
146 Actually, the oil corporations mentioned above fall within the top twenty.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2002:-TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS [here-
inafter UNCTAD Report], at 86 tbl IV.1, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/wir2002_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
147 LEIGHTON, supra note 142 at 3; see also Shira Pridan-Frank, Human-
Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 619, 661 (2002) ("In recent decades, the power and influence of pri-
vate commercial companies have grown, in light of the expansion of international
trade and globalization.").
148 In 2002, there were about 65,000 multinational corporations, and they had
up to 850,000 foreign affiliates around the world. UNCTAD Report, supra note
146, at 14. While in 1990, foreign affiliates accounted for about twenty-four mil-
lion employees, that number rose dramatically to fifty-four million in 2001. Id. at
4 tbl. 1.1. They also recorded sales amounting to $19 trillion which was more than
twice as high as world exports in 2001; in 1990, both were roughly equal. Id. Fur-
ther, over the same period, the stock of outward foreign direct investment in-
creased from $1.7 trillion to $6.6 trillion. Id. Foreign affiliates of MNCs currently
account for one-tenth of world GDP and one-third of world exports. Id. at 14.
149 Job creation internationally has added to the power and influence of
MNCs. See Scott Greathead, The Multinational and the "New Stakeholder": Examin-
ing the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 722 (2002)
(arguing that the government of China is more likely to give greater attention and
regard to the opinion of the CEOs of multinational corporations who have tens of
thousands of Chinese workers in their employ, than the views of the President of
the United States from whom they may not expect much both politically and prac-
tically).
150 See Thomas Donaldson, Can Multinationals Stage a Universal Morality Play?
81 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 51, 52 (1992) ("Third World representatives increasingly ac-
knowledge the role multinationals play as a conduit of technological know-how to
host cultures, and most have adopted a pro-multinational position....").
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negative impact of economic globalization.
The major oil corporations operate in African countries and a
number of them have been implicated in or associated with human
rights violations, 151 environmental pollution and degradation,
152
escalation of poverty conditions, 5 3 and an increase in social vices
in their host communities. 5 4 MNCs have also been accused of
adopting a philosophy and attitude with the African governments
with which they do business that favors detachment from the way
states manage resources and corruption. According to the Presi-
dent of Sao Tome, Fradique de Menezes, this is a significant con-
tributor to the malaise that pervades these countries.
55
151 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbjom Eide et al. eds.,
2000) (describing the role and policies of transnational corporations with respect
to human rights); see also Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge:
Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 183 (2002) (describing
mechanisms to enforce violations of the law of nations).
152 See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and So-
cial Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Annual Activity Report, Annex V (2001) (detailing how the op-
erations of oil corporations have caused environmental degradation and health
problems), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-
966.html. For an example outside the African continent, see JUDITH KIMERLING ET
AL., AMAZON CRUDE (Susan S. Henriksen ed., 1991).
153 See EMEKA DURUIGBO, OIL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL INVESTI-
GATION OF CHEVRON CORPORATION'S PERFORMANCE IN THE NIGER RIVER DELTA (2001)
(discussing Chevron's record of accountability within Nigeria's oil development),
available at http://www.n-h-i.org/Publications/Pubs-pdf/NigeriaCorpAccount.
pdf.
154 Such vices include prostitution and criminal activities by youths who can
not find gainful employment. See HENRY CLARK ET AL., OIL FOR NOTHING:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION, DEATH AND
IMPUNITY IN THE NIGER DELTA (2000) (summarizing the terrible record of environ-
mental destruction and human rights violations in the oil-producing regions of
Nigeria), available at http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/report.
155 Fradique de Menezes, Oiling the Desire for Sao Tome Unity, AFRICA
ANALYSIS, Dec. 2003, at 19.
Oil development . . . cannot be a one-way street, paved with 'take the
money and run' asphalt. I know that many petroleum companies say
that they are not responsible for the well-being of the countries in which
they operate and all--but one--refuse to publish what they pay. Another
multinational mantra is that oil companies are not responsible for how
the money they pay is used. If a country's ruler asks them to deposit
money in a Swiss bank account they do as they are told. If they are
aware that their payments are being misused they nod and wink and
turn away while blaming it all on 'those foolish and corrupt Africans.'
But in order for someone to be corrupt, there must be a corrupter. Cor-
ruption also thrives in secrecy. But it withers when exposed to the scru-
tiny of the public and careful professional oversight.
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4.3. Growing Interest?
Both the World Bank and multinational oil corporations operat-
ing in Africa have begun to pay more attention to the resource
curse, if not in practice, at least in rhetoric. In its first Corporate
Responsibility Report released in 2003, ChevronTexaco stated:
Some countries and regions have been described as suffer-
ing from the so-called "resource curse," a term economists
use to describe locations with abundant natural resources
that are prone to perform worse on economic and social
development indicators than more resource-poor countries.
ChevronTexaco is concerned about this issue. In our view,
addressing fundamental issues related to poverty and
health is a critical stepping stone to being able to help find
solutions to the range of other complex social, economic
and environmental issues where we operate. 5 6
The World Bank has noted in relation to the resource curse or
paradox of plenty 5 7:
Unfortunately, in certain cases, neither investment nor oil
revenues have been able to guarantee economic growth or
poverty reduction. Thus, the presence of major oil and gas
industries has been associated with a variety of negative so-
cial and environmental outcomes. The so-called "Paradox
of Plenty," where resource development fails to generate
the sustainable benefits expected, is one of the most urgent
challenges [at the local and national levels]. 58
Id.
156 CHEVRONTEXACO, 2002 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT
9, available at http://www.chevrontexaco.com/cr-report/2002/ docs/complete_
report.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
157 The terms "resource curse" and "paradox of plenty" are sometimes used
interchangeably. See Scott Pegg, Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts, 56
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 82 (describing the paradox of plenty), available at
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/pdfs/art5-a03.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005). . %
158 WORLD.BANK GROUP, OIL AND GAS SECTOR ISSUES AND POLICY: SOCIAL AND
ECoNOMIC IMPACT, ,available at http:/./www2.ifc.org/ogmc/wbogpolicysocioec
onomic.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
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This phenomenon is again given clear recognition in the World
Bank's World Development Report for 2003. The Bank appears to
have adopted the view, long resisted by some economists, that
natural resource abundance has a considerably negative effect on
the development of vital state institutions.1
59
In recent times, the Bank and oil MNCs have stepped in to play
a more active role in stemming the tide of the resource curse.160
This new posture is clearly illustrated by their efforts in designing
a revenue management plan (the "RMP") under the Chad-
Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project and some support for efforts to im-
prove transparency and accountability through information disclo-
sure. Indeed, oil trust funds and information disclosure (promi-
nent examples of which are the EITI and the PWYP Campaign) are
attracting a great deal of attention as useful tools for addressing the
resource curse in Africa. The next Section discusses these mecha-
nisms.
5. ADDRESSING THE RESOURCE CURSE: NATIONAL TRUST FUNDS
AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The primary thesis presented in this work is that although Af-
rican oil producers manifest the symptoms of the resource curse,
oil is not necessarily a curse to Africans or any group of people.
Instead, the major curse bedeviling African oil exporters is the
curse of leadership. A successive crop of self-centered leaders,
through corruption and ineptitude, has misgoverned the continent,
159 The report directly looks at the resource curse phenomenon:
[Tihe question of whether oil and minerals hinder the emergence of de-
mocratic institutions has been tested empirically and found to hold for a
panel of 113 countries between 1971 and 1997 .... Data on real per cap-
ita GDP show that developing countries with few natural resources grew
2-3 times faster between 1960 and 1990 than natural resource-abundant
countries .... Where norms and rules are weak, greater endowments of
natural resources lead to worse economic performance in the long run,
compared with countries that have smaller resource endowments. Exist-
ing institutions are eroded, and the. emergence of new institutions is
hampered.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, at 149-50 (2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/17957_WDR_2003_chp_7_web.pdf; see also
GARY & KARL, supra note 96 at 18 (discussing how countries that are dependent on
oil exports are over time the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian,
and the most conflict-prone states in the world).
160 See Ross, supra note 25, at 17 ("To their credit, the World Bank Group, and
a set of international mining firms, have begun to look for ways to reduce the so-
cial and environmental costs of oil and mineral projects in developing states.").
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mismanaged resources, and not made any serious efforts to set the
right policies or introduce the type of structures that are pivotal to
ensuring the proper utilization of these natural resource endow-
ments. 161 Even economists have come to appreciate the role of
government policy as an intervening variable. From their collec-
tion of empirical studies, Peter Neary and Sweder van Wijnbergen
came to the important conclusion that "a country's economic per-
formance following a resource boom depends to a considerable ex-
tent on the policies followed by its government," 162 noting that
"even small economies have considerable influence over their own
economic performance."63
Thus, despite some strong arguments to the contrary, 164 there is
hardly anything deterministic about where these oil-exporting
countries have ended. Rather, agency may have played a leading
role.' 65
The central argument here is that oil and other resources are
not the problem; a lot depends on the use to which they have been
put.166 One example that substantiates this point is the role of re-
sources in civil wars and conflicts. Civil wars and conflicts have
been viewed as a component of the resource curse, alongside poor
economic growth and authoritarianism. 67 A closer examination
suggests that resources have played both good and bad roles in
this arena, showing that the problem is not necessarily with the re-
sources. 168 What human beings do with their natural endowments
161 In Botswana, which has not only been blessed with stellar leadership, but
where these leaders have adopted the right approach and policies toward re-
source management, there is a stark contrast to the woeful results in other re-
source-rich African countries. See SAVE TH9 CHILDREN, supra note 30, at 8 (praising
Botswana's approach to its mineral resources).
162 NATURAL REsouRcEs AND THE MACROECONOMY 11 (J. Peter Neary &
Sweder van Wijnbergen eds., 1986), cited in Ross, supra note 44, at 307.
163 Id.
164 See Smith, supra note 37, at 243 (stating that a major deficiency of scholar-
ship in this area is that scholars have conceptualized oil "as a structural variable
willfully exerting its own effects" while "underplay[ing] the importance of agency
and timing").
165 See id. ("[R]egimes may well have avoided the substitution of oil for state-
craft....").
166 See Ross, supra note 36, at 357 ("There is nothing inevitable about the re-
source curse: states like Malaysia, Chile, and Botswana have done relatively well
despite their oil and mineral wealth.").
167 Id. at 328.
168 See Michael Ross, How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evi-
dence from 13 Cases (June 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
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accounts for much of the outcome. Thus, efforts need to be concen-
trated on devising ways of using these resources for good, not evil.
Two prominent arrangements along those lines are oil trusts and
information disclosure.
5.1. National Trust Funds
5.1.1. The Concept of Trust Funds1
69
A trust is an arrangement in law in which legal ownership and
management responsibilities over an asset (res) are placed in the
hands of a person or persons (trustee or trustees) on behalf of and
for the benefit of another person or persons (beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries).170 Oil trust funds are institutions in which the trust assets
consist of oil revenues placed under the control of a board of trus-
tees for the benefit of members of an oil-producing area.
171
The genesis of the trust institution in Anglo-American law is
still the subject of intense disputation. 172 While some accounts
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles) (discussing
different arguments on how resources could play a role in the onset, duration, and
intensity of civil wars and conflicts and also presenting converse arguments).
169 See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic
Development in Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 121, 168 (2004).
170 Marianne Guerin-McManus, Conservation Trust Funds, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2001). Keeton provides the classic definition of a trust as follows:
A trust is the relationship which arises wherever a person (called the
trustee) is compelled in equity to hold property, whether real or per-
sonal, and whether by legal or equitable title, for the benefit of some per-
sons (of whom he may be one and who are termed beneficiaries) or for
some object permitted by law, in such a way that the real benefit of the
property accrues, not to the trustees, but to the beneficiaries or other ob-
jects of the trust.
L. A. SHERIDAN & GEORGE W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2 (11th ed. 1983); see also
DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
3 (15th ed. 1995) ("A trust is an equitable obligation binding a [trustee] to deal with
property over which he has control .... for the benefit of [beneficiaries] .... ").
171 See Barry Spergel, Trust Funds in Common Law Countries, in INTERAGENCY
PLANNING GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS: THE IPG HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS 25 (2000) (defining a trust fund as "a legal structure by
which money or other property is held, invested, and spent by a board of trustees
or board of directors exclusively for a specific charitable purpose, as defined in a
charter or deed of trust"), available at http://www.geocities.com/shores
-system/ef/efhandbook.html. See generally Duruigbo, supra note 169, at 169.
172 Spergel, supra note 171, at 26. It should be emphasized that the trust insti-
tution is not the exclusive preserve of Western and Islamic legal systems. In cen-
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trace the origin to the English use or Middle Eastern/Islamic Law's
waqf, others locate it in Roman fideicommissum.'73 Some scholars
have also propounded the Germanic theory arguing that the trust
owes its origins to the Salic salmannus.17 4 Notwithstanding the ac-
count that one chooses to accept, there seems to be a consensus that
trusts- old and new-have generally arisen where the existing le-
gal mechanisms for accomplishing particular objectives, especially
the holding of property, have been limited by their inadequacy. 75
With the inadequacies surrounding the management of public
properties (including natural resources), the importance of trust
funds cannot be overemphasized. The emphasis of such trusts is
the control and use of revenues or donor funds, grants, or other
funds that form the trust res. The use of the trust institution as a
vehicle for property management is a practice that has seen better
days. It may also be emphasized, however, that the mismanage-
ment of resources is not a necessary condition for establishing a
trust.176 A trust fund can be utilized to accomplish an assortment
turies past, up until modem times, African societies have been able to devise
trust-like institutions to address particular needs such as the management of fam-
ily or communal property. In Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern Nigeria, Vis-
count Haldane stated:.
[T]he notion of individual ownership is quite foreign to native ideas.
Land belongs to the community, the village or the family, never to the
individual. All the members of the community, village, or family have an
equal right to the land, but in every case the Chief or Headman of the
community or village, or head of the family, has charge of the land, and
in loose mode of speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some ex-
tent in the position of a trustee and as such holds the land for the use of
the community or family.
2 A.C. 399, 404 (1921). See also W.C. Ekow Daniels, Some Principles of the Law of
Trusts in West Africa, 6 J. AFR. L. 164 (1962) (discussing the existence of trusts or
trust-like institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone). See generally Du-
ruigbo, supra note 169, at 169, 171.
173 Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited,
70 TuL. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1996).
174 Monica M. Gaudiosi, Comment, The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on
the Development of the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1231, 1242-43 (1988).
175 Guerin-McManus, supra note 170, at 5; Duruigbo, supra note 169, at 169.
176 See Tito v. Waddel (No. 2), 3 All ER. 129 (Ch. 1977) (Eng.) (involving roy-
alties from the sale of phosphates and whether the Crown was trustee of the funds
for the inhabitants of an island colony in the Western Pacific); see also Joseph Gold,
Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund
to a Code of Principles, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 856 (1978) (describing the International
Monetary Fund's effect on international trust law as a trustee of the Trust Fund of
the International Monetary Fund).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss1/1
THE RESOURCE CURSE IN AFRICA
of purposes such as natural resource conservation, 177 environ-
mental protection, 178 and community development.
179
The notion of trusts is emerging as an important part of petro-
leum policy discourse. 80 Some scholars see institutions as being
particularly important in the petroleum industry where oil trusts
can provide an effective check on rent-seeking activity, improve
domestic governance in oil-producing countries, and avoid, miti-
gate, or reverse the resource curse. 81 Such an arrangement would
involve the World Bank and multinational oil corporations and
will in effect amount to a sharing of the oil-producing state's sov-
ereignty. According to Stephen Krasner:
Oil has been a curse for the developing countries in which it
has been located leading to less democracy and lower rates
of growth. Oil concentrates resources in the hands of the
state. The road to wealth and power for any ambitious in-
dividual leads through the offices of the central govern-
ment, not through individual enterprise or productive eco-
nomic activity. Oil wealth makes it possible for the state to
buy off dissenters, and to build military machines that can
be used to repress those who cannot be bought off. Only a
few political entities, such as Alaska and Norway, have
been able to use oil wealth wisely. Domestic governance in
oil rich developing countries could be enhanced by creating
oil trusts. The board of directors of such trusts would be
composed of national and non-national actors. For in-
stance, national directors could be appointed by the coun-
try's parliament or head of state and non-national figures
by the World Bank. All oil revenues would be paid into an
177 Guerin-McManus, supra note 170.
178 Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms
for Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
167 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995).
179 Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and the "Bottom-Up" Ap-
proach: A Review of the Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 133,
169 n.162 (1995). See generally Duruigbo, supra note 169, at 170-71.
180 See Duruigbo, supra note 169, at 169-70 (stating that "[lately, trust funds
have been attracting attention in academic and policy circles as pragmatic tools
for addressing the unfortunate predicament generally manifesting in entities
blessed with natural resources, especially oil.")
181 Stephen D. Krasner, Troubled Societies, Outlaw States, and Gradations of
Sovereignty 41 (July 20,2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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escrow account in a foreign bank. All transfers from the ac-
count would have to be approved by the board of directors
of the trust. There might be commitment to using these
revenues for specific activities such as health care and edu-
cation. The trust would monitor the use of the funds after
they had been transferred to the national government.
8 2
The above proposal bears close resemblance to the arrange-
ment devised by international financial and corporate oil interests
in collaboration with the governments of Chad and Cameroon to
manage and monitor Chad's oil revenues. 183 The RMP established
under the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project is discussed in the fol-
lowing part.
5.1.2. Chad Revenue Management Plan
5.1.2.1. Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project
Oil was first discovered in Chad in the 1970s by a consortium
of oil corporations that included Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, and
Royal Dutch/Shell, 8 4 but years of war and civil conflicts prevented
further development of the oil fields. In the midst of the ensuing
frustration, Conoco left and Chevron sold its interests to Elf Aqui-
tane.
Almost one and one-half decades after the suspension of oil
field development in 1979, a reorganized consortium reignited in-
terest in Chad's oil. The consortium conducted studies on the fea-
sibility of developing the oil and transporting it via Cameroon. 185
Two members of the consortium eventually withdrew, citing as
their reason concerns about the economic viability of the project
since oil was then selling at $10 per barrel. Six months after their
departure, two new members-Malaysia's Petroleum Nasional
Berhad ("Petronas") and Chevron-joined the consortium and the
stake holding stood at forty percent for Exxon, thirty-five percent
182 Id.
183 See also SAVE THE CHILDREN, supra note 30, at 11 (describing the Chad Oil
Pipeline Project's revenue management arrangement as an oil trust fund).
184 Benjamin C. Esty, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipe-
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for Petronas, and twenty-five percent for Chevron. 86
The $3.7 billion Chad-Cameroon pipeline project is the biggest
private sector investment in Africa. One and one-half billion dol-
lars is devoted to the extraction of oil from Chad's Doba Basin
while $2.2 billion will take care of the transportation aspect via a
670-mile (1,070 km) pipeline that passes through Cameroon. Pro-
ject partners formed an unincorporated joint venture known as the
Upstream Consortium to own and finance the exploration compo-
nent. The Chad portion of the pipeline will be owned by Tchad Oil
Transportation Company ("TOTCO"). TOTCO is an incorporated
joint venture between the Upstream Consortium and the govern-
ment of Chad. The Cameroon portion of the pipeline will be under
the ownership of Cameroon Oil Transportation Company
("COTCO"), an entity incorporated as a joint venture between the
governments of Chad and Cameroon and the Upstream Consor-
tium. Total revenues expected from the project would be $13.7 bil-
lion. Projections from the investment were based on the assump-
tion that the fields will produce 883 million barrels of oil that can
be sold. Average expected price is $15 per barrel.
The World Bank was invited to participate in the project.
ExxonMobil had stated that it would only go ahead with the pro-
ject with the World Bank's involvement. This would provide the
company with the needed cushion from political risk and insula-
tion from criticisms from nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs"). In June 2000, the Board of Executive Directors of the
World Bank voted to participate in the project. The World Bank
adduced as the reasons for its participation the project's commer-
cial viability and alleviation of poverty in Chad, one of the poorest
countries on earth. 187 According to the World Bank's President
James Wolfensohn, "the project provides the best, and perhaps
only opportunity for Chad to reduce the severe poverty of most of
its population."188 The World Bank did not seem to have any illu-
sions about the landmines that it would have to face. Thus, the
President noted that as has been the case in many countries, it will
be a tremendous challenge to translate Chad's oil revenues into
services that would be directly beneficial to the poor. But the
World Bank expressed the belief that challenges such as this are of
186 Id. at 1-2.
187 Id. at 6.
188 See id. at 6 (quoting Letter from James D. Wolfensohn, to Honorable James
P. McGovern, U.S. House of Representatives (June 28, 1999)).
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the type that are incumbent on and required of a development in-
stitution of the caliber of the World Bank.189
The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, especially from the
time of the invitation to the World Bank, was mired in controversy.
Public interest groups, among others,. complained about the hu-
man rights-abusing government of Chad, the potential impact of
the project on the environment,190 and the displacement of indige-
nous peoples.191 The World Bank sought to address these concerns
and, as a condition for its participation, insisted on a RMP that
would ensure that the proceeds of oil development were used for
socioeconomic development. The environmental and other aspects
of the project are outside the scope of this work.192 The focus here
is on the RMP and its potential to avoid the problems associated
with oil exploration, production, and export and fulfill the design-
ers' aspirations of meeting the social and economic needs of the
people of Chad.
5.1.2.2. Features of the Revenue Management Plan
According to Ian Gary and Terry Karl, "[tlhe Chad-Cameroon
Oil and Pipeline Project is the most significant, and most closely
watched experiment designed to change the pattern of the 'oil
curse' and promote poverty reduction through targeted use of oil
189 Id.
190 ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, THE CHAD .CAMEROON OIL AND PIPELINE
PROJECT: PUITING PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT AT RISK (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/728_ChadCameroon-pipeli
ne.pdf.
[The World Bank's involvement] sets a disturbing precedent of public
support for oil development which experience and analysis show has
detrimental social and environmental impacts with few development
benefits .... The project as currently designed has little chance of deliv-
ering the claimed benefits to sustainable development while carrying
major risks of irreparable environmental and social disruption.
Id. at 3. Other leading environmental groups such as the Friends of the Earth, the
Sierra Club, and the Rainforest Action Network also vehemently opposed the pro-
ject because of the potential damage to the environment. Esty, supra note 184, at 9.
191 See Norimitsu Onishi, Pygmies Wonder if Oil Pipeline Will Ease Their Poverty,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at A3 (noting that public interest groups are working to
ensure Pygmies are compensated for the impact of an oil pipeline to be built
through the Central African rain forest).
192 For more on the environmental implications and criticisms, see LIABILITY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND THE WORLD BANK'S CHAD-CAMEROON OIL AND
PIPELINE PROJECT (Serge A. Bronkhorst ed., 2000).
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revenues."193 This approach to utilizing oil revenues will be under
the RMP.
The RMP was the fruit of the World Bank's efforts at ensuring
that the attendant dangers of a large influx of oil revenues -
economic distortion, corruption and waste -did not manifest
themselves in. Chad as has been the case in many other oil-
producing countries.1 94 Chad is expected to receive $1.8 billion in
the form of royalties, income taxes, and dividends. This is an
enormous amount of money for a country that has been cash
strapped for years. According to World Bank's President Wolfen-
sohn:
Natural resource "booms" are difficult to manage. This is
why our knowledge of other countries' experience has been
crucial to designing the project. In Chad, in particular, we
want to make certain that the country's new wealth will be
invested for the well-being of all Chadians. With our help,
the Chad Government has developed a revenue manage-
ment program that targets oil revenues to key development
sectors that are at the heart of its poverty alleviation strat-
egy.195
The RMP contains specifications on the allocation and distribu-
tion of the expected revenue. In the course of the first ten years of
production, that is, between 2004 and 2013, income taxes will con-
stitute sixteen percent of total revenues to Chad and the rest will
come from royalties and dividends. The government is given dis-
cretion on how to spend the revenues from income taxes subject to
the limitation that they be used for general development purposes.
The government has less liberty when it comes to royalties and
dividends. A Special Revenue Account is created in which they
would be deposited. A distribution formula has also been speci-
fied. Ten percent of the money will be kept in international finan-
cial institutions as a fund for future generations. Eighty-five per-
cent of the remaining ninety percent will be deposited in local
commercial banks and is dedicated to the financing of programs in
five important sectors namely, education, health and social ser-
193 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 60.
194 See Esty, supra note 184, at 8 (detailing the elements of the RMP).
195 Id.
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vices, rural development, infrastructure, and environment and wa-
ter resources. The remaining fifteen percent would be devoted to
the development of the oil-producing Doba region.
The RMP provides for several layers of oversight. It is incum-
bent on the World Bank and the government of Chad to approve
an annual expenditure, but a nine member oversight committee
has the responsibility to review it. Of the committee's nine mem-
bers, seven represent the government while two represent the civil
society (a nongovernmental organization ("NGO") and a trade un-
ion). The committee members are appointed for terms of three to
five years. The committee will annually publish a review of those
operations that are subject to external audit.
The World Bank has extensive powers and leverage regarding
monitoring of the full program and review of all expenditures. The
RMP is given teeth by the fact that the World Bank insisted that its
implementation is a contractual obligation under the loans that the
IBRD and European Investment Bank ("EIB") were proposing and
tied the performance of the government under the RMP to future
lending by the World Bank.
The World Bank has also instituted an International Advisory
Group. The Group is composed of eminent persons and is slated
to be in existence for ten years. 196 The World Bank Inspection
Panel also represents a level of oversight for the whole project.197
The Chadian government passed a law in December 1998 in-
corporating the principal elements of the RMP, including proce-
dures for audit and provisions relating to the establishment of an
oversight committee, the Oil Revenues Control and Monitoring
Board (Revenue Management College).198 It is still too early to say
how this management plan will turn out. Chad only started selling
196 INT'L ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE CHAD-CAMEROON PETROLEUM DEV. AND
PIPELINE PROJECT ("IAG"), WORK PLAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP 7-8
(July 30, 2001), at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/iag-wp-july
302001.pdf.
197 See Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards
to the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility? 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 120 (2002) (describing a report on the Chad-Cameroon Project
issued by the panel).
198 See WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT: CHAD-CAMEROON
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE PROJECT 101-04 (Apr. 13, 2000) (providing a
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oil in October 2003.199 In November 2003, the sum of $6.5 million,
receipts from the first sale of crude oil, was deposited into the ac-
count, and in December 2003, the government approved its first
budget including oil revenue and submitted it to the Revenue
Management College. 200
Arrangements such as this have the basic ingredients to make
them potentially beneficial. One of the principal benefits, as Kras-
ner observed, is that oil trusts could be used to enhance domestic
governance in those developing countries that are rich in petro-
leum so long as they involve a high level of shared sovereignty in
which national governments and external actors like the World
Bank share key powers on how the oil revenues are managed. 201
A trust fund could also help in building the basic foundation of
a democratic society. It establishes a link between the citizen-
beneficiaries and the authority structures, giving the citizens a
stake in the natural resource and making them keep an eye on how
the government utilizes the money belonging to them. This sense
of ownership exists in developed societies through "taxation with
representation." Reduction of the corrosive problem of corruption
and the promotion of transparency and accountability are also
some of the advantages that such funds can bring.
Nevertheless, the funds need to be properly structured to be
able to do that. Chad's RMP is not perfect and has been subjected
to severe criticisms. Some see it as not going far enough. Peter
Rosenblum attacked the efforts as being at a rudimentary stage:
Oil will not lead to development in Chad without real par-
ticipation, real transparency, and real oversight, none of
which currently exists. The proposed RMP and the law
that was essentially imposed on the Chadian authorities is,
at best, a first step in that direction.202
According to a report authored by Luc Lampiere and others at
Harvard Law School's Human Rights Program, the law "repre-
199 See, e.g., Emily Wax, Oil Wealth Trickles Into Chad, but Little Trickles Down,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2004, at A16 (reporting on the first few months of oil sales);
see also Oil Pipeline Opens for Business, 17 AFR. REcOVERY 24 (2003) (describing the
fiscal aspects of the oil pipeline).
200 Wax, supra note 199, at A16.
201 Krasner, supra note 181, at 41.
202 ENvTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 190, at 5.
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sents a remarkable breakthrough in linking private investment,
development and human rights" but its chances of success are in-
finitesimally low unless it is accompanied by the will of the politi-
cal leaders or the confidence of the citizens.203 The absence of a
clear distribution formula among the designated priority sectors
could also present problems because revenues are disproportion-
ately allocated to one sector to the disadvantage of others. 20 4 It
could be counterargued, however, that a measure of flexibility is
warranted and that micromanaging should be discouraged, but the
problem is that political leaders can take advantage of it to favor
their choice projects or benefit their areas, a line of action that
could fuel tensions in a country enmeshed in power struggles and
ethnic divisions.20 5
Critics also think that a weakness of the Chad management
plan is that there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the belief that the government will follow its dictates.20 6 They
point to the fact that the government spent four million dollars out
of a twenty-five, million dollar signature bonus on arms pur-
chases. 207 The problem with this criticism is that while it would
have been preferable for the government to spend the money on
more worthwhile projects or follow the RMP in this instance, this
situation was not covered by the governing law. So, the govern-
ment can hardly be fairly accused of not following a law that was
inapplicable to its action.
Another bone of contention is that significant revenues from oil
are still outside the scope of the RMP. Moreover, the arrangement
does not cover all the oil fields in the country. These loopholes
could defeat the whole purpose of ensuring proper and transpar-
ent management of funds. 20 8
Another aspect of the RMP that has invited criticism is the
203 Luc Lampriere et al., Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies
and Institutional Weaknesses, Human Rights Clinical Program, Harvard Law
School (October 13, 1999), at 2, 5.
204 Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and
the World Bank's Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 197, 223 (2001) (relat-
ing the details of the Revenue Management Law).
205 Id.
206 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 68.
207 Id. The Chadian government's action embarrassed the World Bank. See
Dana L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountabil-
ity, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 210 n.17 (2002) (noting the earlier failure of the
World Bank to monitor Chad's oil expenditures).
208 Id. at 69.
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Monitoring Committee. The mandate of the Committee looks
murky.209 The Committee is also viewed as not sufficiently strong,
which could militate against the effective discharge of its duties.
For instance, it has been suggested that giving the Monitoring
Committee subpoena powers would strengthen it and enhance its
work.210 The process of removing Monitoring Committee members
is also easy, making it possible to conveniently remove even com-
petent members who fall out of favor with the government.21' The
representatives of the Civil Society are also not required to be ac-
countable to their constituency and could turn around to work
against the interests of those they are supposed to represent. A
possible solution would be to give powers of election and recall to
NGOs and labor groups over their representatives.
The RMP is also assailed for not providing for stabilization or
sterilization funds to serve as a buffer against oil shocks and con-
trol the influx of money in such excessive amounts as to lead to in-
flation and the Dutch Disease. 212 This is particularly important be-
cause Chad will be receiving money far in excess of the fifteen
dollar per barrel projections as oil prices have skyrocketed, hitting
almost the forty dollar per barrel mark in March 2004 and over
fifty dollars later that year. 213
The revenue management law is also considered inadequate
because it can be changed by presidential decree. Critics argue
that a change permissible only through an act of Parliament would
better ensure that the arrangement is not subject to the whims and
caprices of the president. 214 A counterargument is that even if the
law only stipulates for amendment via the parliamentary process,
an unaccountable president would still find ways to manipulate
things and effect changes. The constitution is without doubt the
fundamental legal and political instrument in the land and usually
very hard to amend. Yet, Chadian President Idris Derby is cur-
rently working to see that the constitution is amended to enable
209 Id. at 70.
210 Lampriere, supra note 203.
211 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 72 (discussing Chad's removal of Amine
Ben Bark from his post on the Bank for Central African States, which caused him
to lose his post as the president of the Revenue Oversight Committee).
212 Id.
213 See Mark Niquette et al., Gasoline 101: A Primer on High Prices, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 2004, at 1H ("The price of oil per barrel has risen from $30 in
November to $38 in recent days.").
214 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 70.
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him to run for a third term in office. 215 At the same time, the presi-
dent has appointed his brother-in-law to head the Central Bank,
thus giving him a seat in the Revenue Management College. Issues
such as these are not things that any RMP or trust fund would be
expected to address. Such funds, as the World Bank has pointed
out, are not a substitute for the development of appropriate de-
mocratic institutions and macroeconomic policies.
216
It is instructive to note that none of the criticisms seem to sug-
gest that it is not a good idea to use this kind of arrangement for
the equitable distribution and proper management of resources.
The important thing is to devise such arrangements in a way that
avoids factors that could lead to their ineffectiveness.
5.2. Information Disclosure
5.2.1. The Concept of Information Disclosure
Over the years, the disclosure of information has been viewed
as a veritable means of accomplishing certain policy goals. 217 Laws
requiring the dissemination and availability of information have
been used to promote public health, environmental protection, and
similar issues. 218
Information disclosure is particularly attractive where there is a
strong resistance to regulation or where the political will to do so is
non-existent. Because information disclosure may be able to
achieve the same goals as command and control regulation, it is
sometimes considered a form of regulation.219 This fact has not
won it the endearment of those opposed to regulation. On the
215 Wax, supra note 199, at A16.
216 See GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 70 ("[A]s the World Bank's Inspection
Panel noted, the successful 'translation of oil revenues into equitable, effective
economic development and poverty reduction extends well beyond budget alloca-
tions and the auditing and control of public expenditure.' It also requires effective
democratic institutions." (footnote omitted)).
217 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 46 (2003) ("[Plarticularly in the case of pollution, requirements to collect
and disseminate information have led to significant change in the behavior of
regulated parties, even in the absence of overt prescriptive regulation.").
218 See generally, JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA & JULIE B. KAPLAN, POISONOUS PROCED-
URAL "REFORM": IN DEFENSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT TO KNOW (2002), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/papers/poisonpaper.pdf.
219 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws
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other hand, it enjoys strong approbation from the pro-regulation
camp, which sees it as a less cumbersome means to an identified
end.
Information disclosure as a policy tool has been utilized at both
domestic and international levels. Companies and governments
have been required to report on their emissions, 220 discharges into
the oceans or compliance with international regulations, 221 and the
composition of their products with particular emphasis on toxic-
ity.222 At the moment, there is an ongoing right-to-know campaign
to change California law and require corporations doing business
abroad to report on their health, labor, safety, and environmental
practices. 223 A similar drive has been embarked upon to draft an
international treaty along those lines.224
A general benefit of information disclosure is the promotion of
transparency and accountability. Proceeding on the dictum that
"sunshine is a disinfectant"225 it ensures that nefarious practices
done in the dark are exposed, thereby discouraging such conduct
and equipping or empowering the society to react in a manner that
it deems appropriate.
Information disclosure is also viewed from the entitlement per-
spective by which it is seen as the right of the people to know or
have access to information about matters that pertain to them. In
essence, proponents believe that there is a right to information at
220 ECHEVERRIA & KAPLAN, supra note 218, at 3-4.
221 See Emeka Duruigbo, International Relations, Economics and Compliance with
International Law: Harnessing Common Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve
Global Problems, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 177 (2001) (examining the international rela-
tions theory in relation to "ship-source oil pollution control" and discussing the
economic effect of treaty implementation).
222 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to Reduce Lead Exposures with One Simple
Statute: The Experience of Proposition 65, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10581 (1999) (discussing
California's Proposition 65, which has been successful in reducing public expo-
sure to lead).
223 See California Right to Know Project, at http://www.crtkcalifor nia.org
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
224 See EarthRights Int'l, International Right to Know Campaign, at http://
www.earthrights.org/irtk.index.shtrnl (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
M Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914) ("Sunshine is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."). See also
Mary Graham, Is Sunshine the Best Disinfectant? The Promise and Problems of Envi-
ronmental Disclosure, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 2002, at 18 (exploring applicability of
Louis D. Brandeis's statement that "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants"
(alteration in original)).
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the domestic226 and international levels. 227 This right is independ-
ent of whether people benefit from the notion of information dis-
closure or not. It is against the backdrop of these major benefits
and this reasoning that information disclosure initiatives have re-
cently emerged to confront the problems of oil development.
5.2.2. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Publish
What You Pay Campaign
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johan-
nesburg in September 2002, the Prime Minister of the United King-
dom, Tony Blair, announced the EITI. The objective is the increase
of transparency at two levels: corporate and governmental. Thus,
it seeks to enhance transparency of payments made by companies
to governments and government-linked entities and of revenues
accruing to the host country governments. 228 The EITI anchors the
justification for this initiative on the inability of mineral wealth
over the years to bring benefits to people in the mineral-producing
countries:
Revenues from oil, gas and mining companies, in the form
of taxes, royalties, signature bonuses and other payments
should be an important engine for economic growth and
social development in developing and transition countries.
However, the lack of accountability and transparency in
these revenues can exacerbate poor governance and lead to
corruption, conflict and poverty.229
The EITI therefore seeks to replace the "lose-lose" situation that
is currently the case in which the various stakeholders are disad-
vantaged in one form or another with a mutually beneficial ar-
rangement for all concerned. Ordinary citizens are being deprived
of the gains of their patrimony and MNCs are (sometimes unde-
servedly) accused of being complicit with corruption and thus
226 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under
California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 319 (1996) ("The statutory pream-
ble likewise declares the people's right 'to be informed ..
227 Ganesan, supra note 7, at 60.
228 DEP'T FOR INTL DEV. (UNITED KINGDOM), ExTRACTIVE INDUsTRIEs TRANS-
PARENCY INITIATIVE [hereinafter EITI], at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files
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hurting their investment standing and public image, while gov-
ernments are sometimes shortchanged by MNCs. Moreover, tax-
payers in the North are left with little or no option but to contrib-
ute aid to these countries even though their problems are caused
by their leaders' mismanagement of resources. The international
community also loses because these oil-producing states' problems
could disrupt the world energy supply.
230
The EITI could help in ensuring that citizens are empowered to
demand accountability from their governments and thus benefit
more from their natural resources, as governments constrained by
the disclosure of their revenues become more responsible. The im-
proved climate would also be valuable in attracting additional in-
vestments from which governments would benefit. The EITI is
also set to favor "responsible [oil] companies" who will have the
benefit of "a more level playing field, a more predictable business
environment, and better prospects for energy security."231 The de-
cision to concentrate the initiative on the extractive sectors was
based on the understanding that "there is a close correlation be-
tween the countries rich in natural resources and the countries
with high levels of poverty." 23
2
The EITI is a voluntary initiative and this has been a source of
criticism. 233 While voluntary or non-binding and unenforceable ar-
rangements have their merits, they are also riddled with inadequa-
cies. 234 Advantages of voluntary mechanisms include greater
chances of eliciting support 235 and better prospects for real compli-
ance with rules that flows from an internalization of the same.
236
230 See GLOBAL WITNESS, GLOBAL WITNESS STATEMENT TO THE EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 1, available at http://www.globalwitness
.org/reports/download.php/00101.pdf (summarizing problems with the status
quo) (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
231 EITI, supra note 228, at 1.
232 Id.
233 See GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 230, at 1 (expressing concern that "the
voluntary approach explicitly proposed by the EITI will not work in those coun-
tries where it is most needed").
234 For an extensive discussion of the limits and utilities of voluntary ar-
rangements, see DURUIGBO, supra note 137, at 121-36 (reviewing the strengths and
weaknesses of corporate codes of conduct).
235 See JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS:
SETrING GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS 46 (1985) ("[For ex-
ample,] acceptance of the voluntary mode [was] essential to secure participation
in the [UNCTAD Code on Restrictive Business Practices] by most Western gov-
ernments as well as the acquiescence of many corporations.").
236 For a discussion of the concept of internalization of norms, see Harold
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Most importantly, voluntary arrangements can form the bedrock
for future binding mechanisms or public initiatives at the domestic
and international levels. 237 On the other hand, disadvantages
abound. For instance, they create opportunities for the thriving of
a free rider situation in which those who are not making the neces-
sary efforts to reform their practices nevertheless share in the bene-
fits provided by the progress made by their peers.238 Therefore the
abundance of potential for excessive opportunism should call for
binding mechanisms or institutions.239
The problem of a competitive disadvantage that flows from
voluntary disclosure prompted TotalFinaElf to state that it would
only disclose payments if other corporations did the same.240 Vol-
untary arrangements are also prone - some would say doomed - to
ineffectiveness due to the absence of independent monitoring or
enforcement mechanisms. 241 Nevertheless the EITI has attracted
support from a broad range of entities including the World Bank
Group,242 the IMF,243 the government of Nigeria, and a host of non-
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599, at 2645-
58 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)
and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995)). For further discussion, see also Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1960-62 (2002) (discussing the role
of the transnational legal process in encouraging compliance with human rights
treaties even when compliance appears to be against a state's self-interest).
237 The history of regulation amply illustrates that voluntary initiatives have
often preceded mandatory rules, especially when those non-binding initiatives
could not live up to their billing, leading society to clamor for stricter regulations.
Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Lim-
its and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives,
30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 111, 157 (1998); Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-
Darricarr~re, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Con-
duct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 687 (1995); Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus
Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the Preservation of Collo-
quy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 327, 353-69 (1994).
238 DURUIGBO, supra note 137, at 129-30.
239 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International
Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 41 (1999) ("Asset specificity ... gives rise to potential
opportunism. In turn, this gives rise to the need for binding mechanisms or insti-
tutions....").
240 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 96 n.55.
241 See Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the
Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 383, 401-05 (1996) (detailing the three types of voluntary codes of conduct in
the garment industry).
242 Press Release, World Bank Group, WBG Endorses Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (Dec. 9, 2003) [hereinafter WBG Endorses EITI], at
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governmental organizations. 244
The PWYP Campaign, launched in June 2002 by the interna-
tional financier and philanthropist George Soros, the Open Society
Institute, and the international NGO Global Witness, is similar to
the EITI. One crucial difference between the EITI. and the PWYP is
that while the EITI is comfortable with disclosure of aggregate
payments made by all the resource companies operating in a coun-
try to the government, the PWYP insists on disclosure of disaggre-
gated payments.
Perhaps the most significant point of divergence is that the
PWYP calls for mandatory disclosure of information. The PWYP
believes that voluntary disclosure has not been effective because
more responsible companies are afraid of being undercut by their
less scrupulous competitors. As a matter of fact, when BP went
ahead to disclose payments made to the Angolan government, it
found itself in troubled waters with the government and its com-
petitors. The PWYP campaign therefore urges the governments of
the highly industrialized nations ("G7") to impose a requirement
on MNCs to disclose what they pay to their host governments.
Stock market regulators would be made to require resource com-
panies to disclose such payments as a condition of being listed.245
One of the major problems faced by the mandatory disclosure
requirements is the sanctity of contracts principle, a cardinal prin-
ciple in Anglo-American jurisprudence and international business
transactions. 246 Moreover, it excludes corporations that are not
http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/O,,contentMDK:20143
509-menuPK:34463-pagePK:64003015-piPK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
243 See Horst Kohler, Remarks at Conference for the Tenth Anniversary of the
Introduction of the Tenge, Nov. 14, 2003 (transcript available through the Federal
News Service) ("The IMF supports the U.K.-led Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative....").
244 The Nigerian government also supports the Publish What You Pay Cam-
paign. See Press Release, Transparency International, Nigeria Takes the Lead on
Oil Industry Revenue Transparency (Nov. 7, 2003) ("[President Obasanjo] stated
his support for the principles of the NGO-led campaign Publish What You Pay...
."), at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2003/2003.11.07.nig
eria oil industryjrevenue.html; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WARRI CRIsIs:
FUELING VIOLENCE 21 (2003) ("In November 2003, President Obasanjo announced
that the Nigerian government would publish budgets... in line with the interna-
tional 'Publish What You Pay' campaign .. "), at http://www.hrw.org/reports
/2003/nigeriall03/nigeriallO3.pdf.
245 Thomas I. Palley, Publish What You Pay: Confronting Corruption and the
Natural Resource Curse, OPEN SoC'Y INST., July 1, 2003, at http://www.soros
.org/initiatives/washington/articles-publications/ articles/publishpay_20030304.
246 See Margarita T. B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum
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listed on the stock market (including large state-owned oil corpora-
tions), a feature that enables the excluded entities to evade the
same obligations it assiduously seeks to impose. This lacuna is
huge. Further, like many initiatives that are birthed in the devel-
oped world, requirements of information disclosure have not es-
caped accusations that they are laced with racial undertones or an-
chored in resistance to imperialism. Other measures, such as the
EITI and trust funds, imposed by external bodies are also open to
this criticism.
However, the major impediments to implementation of infor-
mation disclosure and strong national trust funds are the absence
of international corporate regulation and the concept of state sov-
ereignty.
6. MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL TRUST
FUNDS AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The importance of information disclosure can hardly be over-
stated. For MNCs, it could mean a reduction in exposure to'busi-
ness risks. Investing in troubled countries comes with a reputa-
tional disadvantage. Investors are beginning to worry that such
bad association with a company's name or brand could harm their
investments. Besides, conflicts and other problems with which
some of these countries have been identified are considered inimi-
cal to business. One way companies can extricate themselves from
this tangled web is through disclosure of their payments. This
would establish in the minds of the public that the companies are
not responsible for the mismanagement of the huge revenues that
accrue to governments.2
47
A necessary corollary of corporate exoneration from the misuse
Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217, 234 (2002) (citing a case where a sta-
bilization clause in a petroleum contract was justified by the general principle of
the sanctity of contract). See generally DAVID H. PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTR-
ACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 1 (1959) (exploring conceptions of the law of contracts).
247 As a group of European investors that represents up to $650 billion put it,
in calling on companies to promote greater transparency in their revenue pay-
ments: "This is a significant business risk, making companies vulnerable to accu-
sations of complicity in corrupt behavior, impairing their local and global, license
to operate, rendering them vulnerable to local conflict and in security, and possi-
bly compromising their long-term commercial prospects in these markets." Press
Release, Co-operative Insurance Society, Investors Call for Greater Transparency
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of oil revenues is a positive perception by the public, which is
likely to benefit the oil corporations. There may be a division of
opinion as to whether a good corporate image or public opinion
confers commercial benefits. However, hardly anyone thinks that
a good image is a detriment. Indeed, there is a very strong basis
for the belief that companies enjoying positive public opinion are
likely to have better economic performance. 248 It is no wonder that
corporations spend a lot of money on public relations campaigns to
burnish their images. 249 Subscribing to information disclosure
could even provide better protection for corporate reputation than
other avenues and mechanisms that companies have adopted to
achieve the same objective such as codes of conduct and corporate
philanthropy. 250
Some commentators have also observed that the publication of
monies paid to local governments could be to the advantage of
companies that face incessant demands for local benefits. 25' This is
premised on the fact that with the knowledge that the governments
are receiving vast sums of money from the oil corporations, mem-
bers of the host communities would give the corporations breath-
ing space and turn their attention to their errant local government
authorities. 252
It stands to reason therefore that information disclosure will
also provide benefits to local communities. It will give a needed
fillip and arsenal to civil society groups and local citizens, allowing
them to focus more aggressively on how the disclosed payments
are being managed by their political leaders.253 This could even
248 See, e.g., Brand New Day, ECONOMIST, June 19-25, 1993, at 70-71 (stating that
the global economy has entered "the era of the corporate image" in which "con-
sumers will increasingly make purchases on the basis of a firm's whole role in so-
ciety: how it treats employees, shareholders, and local neighbourhoods"); see also
Geoffrey Heal, The Bottom Line to a Social Conscience, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 2001, Mas-
tering Investment (Magazine), at 2 (noting the increasing "use of consumer buying
power to attain social goals"); Sankar Sen & C.B. Bhattacharya, Does Doing Good
Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility, 38
J. MKTG. RES. 225 (2001) (exploring when corporate social responsibility initiatives
work).
249 See Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product: Corporate
Associations and Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. MKTG. 68 (1997) (examining the
effects of corporate associations on product responses).
250 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 50-52.
251 Id. at 6.
252 Id.
253 See id. at 53 (describing the benefits of mandatory disclosure of oil com-
pany payments).
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lead to a reduction in conflicts among the various stakeholders as
the lack of information and the mismanagement that flows from it
certainly play a role in engendering strife in oil-producing areas.
Joseph Stiglitz has noted that transparency in information relat-
ing to the revenues received by the government and fiscal account-.
ing standards is essential to improving natural resource manage-
ment and increasing wealth, since without that transparency
governments are lulled into a false sense of wealth that prompts
them to make bad policy decisions. In addition:
Even more important is information about what the gov-
ernment receives for oil or other natural resources, how this
compares with what other countries are receiving, and how
the government uses the funds it receives from the sale of
natural resources. Governments should recognize that
even in more developed countries major oil companies
have tried to minimize their royalty payments by under-
reporting the effective price of oil and over-reporting their
costs. It was only through hard research that such evasion
was detected, for instance, in the State of Alaska, and it was
only through even harder prosecution that the oil compa-
nies finally agreed to pay the more than a billion dollars
that they had avoided paying the state.
Companies have strong incentives to maximize profits and
the opacity that surrounds oil contracts and payments can
lead to abuse.254
Based on these perceived benefits, there is no doubt that schol-
ars and campaigners will continue to try to convince oil-producing
developing countries in Africa and other places to embrace the
concept. One is left to wonder why this is not yet national policy
in most of these countries. The reality is that the governments
would have to evaluate what danger it poses to them before they
consider what benefits it holds for their country. A similar ques-
tion or situation arises with national trust funds.
254 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Foreword to SVETLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN OIL WINDFALLS:
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The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project is being credited with
providing a model that is so useful that expectations are high about
the possibility of its replication. According to some commentators:
The World Bank effort on the Chad-Cameroon project is an
innovative experiment, in the context of past development
failures based on oil, and elements of the project could pos-
sibly be replicated elsewhere. Chad's Revenue Manage-
ment Law and the Revenue Oversight Committee are novel
institutions that could play a useful role if properly sup-
ported, and they could be adapted for other country con-
texts. The World Bank's Independent Advisory Group,
with a strengthened mandate, could prove useful in other
high profile, high-risk projects.255
This is likely to be the route recommended for the new oil pro-
ducers in Africa and perhaps even the older oil exporters. One
World Bank Group official has remarked: "This is going to be the
model for every single project of this type world wide." 256 In view
of the criticisms leveled against the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline
Project, such replication will be expected to incorporate changes
that are tougher on governments, while favoring citizens. But the
reality is that sovereignty and the absence of corporate regulation
are strong impediments to implementing the type of arrangement
that critics have proposed. This part discusses these two impedi-
ments.
6.1. Sovereignty
In its simplest form, sovereignty25 7 refers to "the power of
255 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 73. Some commentators, however, are not
so enthusiastic, perceiving weaknesses in the structure -of projects that would
make it easier for the government to out-maneuver the World Bank and the oil
corporations at such a point that withdrawal from the country would be virtually
impossible. See James C. Owens, Note, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa:
The International Community's Options, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1044-49 (2003) (advo-
cating an alternative arrangement in which an international supervisory body
would be entrusted with the control, allocation and management of revenues ac-
cruing to developing countries from international projects).
256 GARY & KARL, supra note 96, at 60 (quoting Mohamedu Diop, Central Af-
rica Resident Representative of the IFC).
257 For interesting and stimulating discussions on sovereignty, see generally
STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds.,
2002); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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states to regulate their internal affairs without foreign interfer-
ence."2 8 Sovereignty is at the foundation of international law,25 9
especially with its connection to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648,
which is widely regarded as giving birth to the nation-state and in-
ternational law.260 One of the earliest leading authorities on sover-
eignty and statehood, Jean Bodin, viewed sovereignty as being the
absolute domain of the state, "not limited either in power, or in
function, or in length of time." 261 Hugo Grotius, widely regarded
as the father of international law, conceived of the concept in abso-
lutist terms, writing that sovereignty was "not subject to the con-
trol of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any
other human will." 262 The United Nations Charter provides for
and protects the notion of sovereignty 263
The principle of sovereignty has a number of corollaries, in-
cluding the sovereign equality of States and the principle of nonin-
tervention.264 The Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel elaborated on
and emphasized the sovereign equality of states, noting: "A dwarf
is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign
state than the most powerful kingdom."265 Vattel did not mince
258 Stephen M. Shrewsbury, September 11th and the Single European Sky: Devel-
oping Concepts of Airspace Sovereignty, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 115, 115 (2003); see also
Richard L. O'Meara, Note, Applying the Critical Jurisprudence of International Law to
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua, 71 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (1985) (" [S]overeign states possess complete author-
ity within their respective national spheres.") (emphasis in original).
259 The International Court of Justice declared in Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27) that "the whole of international law" is anchored upon the "fundamental
principle of State sovereignty." Id. at 133. See also Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The
Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: International Law, International Protection, and
the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1997) (discussing the promi-
nence of sovereignty in the United Nations Charter).
260 See Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law
Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 417, 419-28 (2000) (discussing the history of the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty).
261 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE Six BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 3 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(1583); see also Shrewsbury, supra note 258, at 117-21 (discussing the evolution of
the principle of state sovereignty in the context of international commercial law).
262 HUGO GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 62 (A. C. Campbell trans.,
Hyperion Reprint ed., Hyperion Press 1979) (1901); see also Shrewsbury, supra note
258, at 117-18 (quoting Grotius).
263 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the princi-
ple of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
264 Shen, supra note 260, at 419-20.
265 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
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words about the importance of sovereignty: "Of all the rights that
can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious
and that which other nations. ought most scrupulously to re-
spect."266 Moreover, although there is a traditional association of
the principle of nonintervention with the Peace of Westphalia,
there was no explicit articulation of the concept until one hundred
years later in 1758 when Vattel published his Le Droits des Gens, ou,
Principes de la Loi Naturelle, Appliques a la Conduite & Aux Affaires des
Nations & des Souverains.267 The prohibition of interference and in-
tervention provided for in Article 2.7 of the U.N. Charter is one of
the most important corollaries of sovereignty. 268
Sovereignty is a useful concept in protecting smaller nations
from mightier powers. However, problems arise where a state has
failed, is abusive, or is weak. Such states are unable to provide for
the needs of the citizens and sometimes aggressively work against
the citizens' interests through anti-people policies and practices.
At the same time, these states are enabled to shield themselves
with the concept of sovereignty or its corollaries. In such a situa-
tion, the ability of external entities like the World Bank to compel
these states to adopt policies is severely curtailed. Additionally, in
the case of the World Bank, based on its Articles of Agreement,
there is a reluctance to interfere in the political activities of bor-
rower countries.269 A towering challenge is how to decouple the
present conception of sovereignty from the entity of government.
In recent times, there has been a progressive movement toward
curtailing the reach of sovereignty for the purposes of humanitar-
ian intervention. The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, a number of eminent scholars that convened
in Canada in 2001, came up with an important report on the place
of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in today's
world. These international luminaries representing a cross-section
of the globe reasoned that there is a "responsibility to protect" at-
tach to states to protect the lives and liberty of their nationals, and
where states are unable to do so owing to state failure or the out-
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (C.
Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
266 Id.
267 Krasner, supra note 181, at 45 n.2.
268 Shen, supra note 260, at 423.
269 See generally Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the
World Bank, 15 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 227 (2002) (noting the limits of the World Bank's
mandate).
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break of war or hostilities, the responsibility devolves to the inter-
national community. 270 Thus, the Commission essentially chal-
lenges the traditional understanding of sovereignty.
271
A similar extension or redefinition of the concept of sover-
eignty has been proposed in the context of international security.
272
Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter state that the duty has
three essential features, namely control of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the people who possess them;
emphasis on prevention; and collective exercise of the duty
through a global or regional organization.
273
The chances of an extension of this emerging idea of legitimate
intervention to other areas, such as where a state has been unable
to provide for the citizens due to the profligacy and irresponsibility
of the leaders, are remote. Yet, in the foreseeable future, it is not a
stretch to begin to imagine that the contours of sovereignty would
experience a continuous chipping away-slowly, but steadily-to
the extent where national leaders would not be able to hide under
it to dehumanize their citizens. In that sense, sovereignty would
once again begin to serve its proper purpose as a tool for the peo-
ple's protection and benefit.274 Indeed, Vattel argued that "national
sovereignty belonged originally and essentially to the people col-
lectively. Nations could subsequently cede sovereignty to a senate
or to a single person, but only to the common good of all citi-
zens." 275
When governments begin to act as though state sovereignty is
270 INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS].
271 Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF.
136, 140 (2004). According to the Commission, "where a population is suffering
serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of
nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." ICISS, supra
note 270, at xi.
272 Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 271.
273 Id. at 137.
274 Some scholars assert that this shift has already begun, with greater em-
phasis on "sovereignty of the people" than on "sovereignty for the benefit of the
nation-state." Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). As a matter of fact, some scholars call for the abrogation
of the concept of sovereignty entirely. See LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 10 (1995) ("We might do well to relegate the term sover-
eignty to the shelf of history.").
275 Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 403, 410 (1996).
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their personal property and that they can use the powers attached
to or inherent in sovereignty to work against the common good of
the citizens, it is incumbent on the international community and
international institutions like the World Bank to insist on promot-
ing the interest of the people or refrain from doing business with
the renegade governments.276 This could amount to an informal
contraction or re-definition of the notion of sovereignty.
The World Bank could be said to have taken some steps in that
regard with the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project. It would ap-
pear that the revenue management arrangements encroached on
Chad's sovereignty. 277 Peter Rosenblum highlights this point:
At the core is a challenge to the sovereignty of undemo-
cratic rulers .... Previously, no one would have interfered
in the relations between an oil company and an African
state. He who ruled the state controlled its resources ....
There is still hope of a delicate balance, where the World
Bank strengthens loan conditions that reinforce the democ-
ratic process in Chad and enable the Chadian people to bet-
ter determine how their resources should be spent. That
would still threaten the sovereignty of leaders, but would
also empower the people.278
If the World Bank really hopes to address the resource curse in
new and old oil-producing African States, it should be prepared
for a policy that makes it clear to some of the authoritarian or self-
centered leaders that the interests of the people should be para-
mount. This would include accepting strengthened national trust
funds and support for mandatory disclosure of information on oil
receipts. The World Bank is already working with the government
of Sao Tome on managing expected oil revenue and saving for the
276 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 800-02 (2003) (recognizing that the traditional con-
cepts of sovereignty are dissolving and proposing a role for international institu-
tions in managing the transition and the future effects).
277 Krasner sees the arrangements as a case of shared sovereignty, although in
"watered down form." Krasner, supra note 181, at 34.
278 Peter Rosenblum, Pipeline Politics in Chad, 99 CURRENT HIST., 195, 199
(2000).
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future.279 It is expected that these strong principles will form a part
of the arrangement that the Bank comes up with.
6.2. Absence of Corporate Regulation in International Law
International law has been described as the law governing
States in their relation with one another.280 The States-centric, tra-
ditional view of international law confers on States the status of
subjects of international law to the exclusion of all other entities
that interact on the international plane.281 The past few decades
have witnessed an encroachment into this turf that used to be the
exclusive preserve of nation-states. Other entities, namely interna-
tional organizations282 and individuals (to a limited extent)283 have
been recognized as possessing international legal personality and
thus subjects of international law.284 The same can hardly be said
of MNCs, notwithstanding their enormous influence in the domes-
tic and international planes that has continued to grow over the
years.285 The international legal system, instead, has left the regu-
lation of these behemoths to municipal authorities 28 6 with the at-
tendant unsatisfactory consequences.
287
279 Shaxson, supra note 119.
280 J. L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 1 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963)
(defining international law as "the body of rules and principles of action which
are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another").
281 See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing
Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 753 ("The only subjects of interna-
tional law are nation-states."); Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of In-
ternational Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 165, 193 n.145 (1988) (defining transnational corporations); Sigmund Tim-
berg, An International Trade Tribunal: A Step Forward Short of Surrender of Sover-
eignty, 33 GEo. L.J. 373, 394-98 (1945) (reviewing the status of private parties).
282 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79 (Apr, 11) (advising that the United Nations be a subject fal-
ling under international law).
283 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 '(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955).
284 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 LAW Q. REV. 97,
117-19 (1948).
285 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 55
(1994) (analyzing risk in foreign investment); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1987) (discussing the effect
of international law).
286 For a general discussion on this subject, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
287 See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. For Violat-
ing International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 84-86 (1999) (describ-
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Regulation of MNCs in international law has not been realized
mainly because such regulation would necessarily import their un-
ambiguous recognition as entities in possession of international le-
gal personality. There is still a huge debate as to whether corpora-
tions, especially MNCs, are international legal persons.
288
In the absence of an international regulatory structure for
MNCs that are generally not amenable to legal control in their host
countries, 289 it is hard to elicit their cooperation on some of these
issues. In particular, the determination of a corporation to go by
higher standards will be derailed once there is a realization that
others can successfully avoid playing by those rules. Corporate
regulation in international law is an idea worthy of serious consid-
eration, especially as it will seek to harmonize the multifarious
rules with which corporations are expected to comply. Even if
mandatory rules are created under the PWYP Campaign, compel-
ling corporations to disclose their payments, there will still be
other aspects of corporate life or endeavor that affect people and
the environment over which clamor for corporate control will con-
tinue. A universal regulatory structure at the international level
will serve the purpose better.
It will also eliminate the problem of competitive advantage
which less scrupulous firms will have over more conscientious
ones. For instance, if some corporations choose to bulk the trend
ing the ineffectiveness due to lack of effective international regulation).
288 For the view that corporations have now been imbued with international
legal personality, see Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign In-
vestment, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259, 272-76 (1997); Michael Reiterer, Book
Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 970, 970-74 (1987) (reviewing RUTH DONNER, THE
REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983)); Chow, supra note 281.
For a contrary view, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
67 (6th ed. 2003); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
368-69 (4th ed. 2001); Peter Malanczuk, Recent Publications: The New Public Order,
26 YALE J. INT'L L. 527, 547 (2001). For the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, see Case Concerning
the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 20/21, at 41 (July 12) and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (U.K. v.
Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
289 See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
International Law: Wherefrom Here? 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n.5 (2003) ( "In many
situations, states, especially developing ones, can be weaker than MNCs in terms
of both economic and legal capacity."); see also Nicola Jagers, The Legal Status of the
Multinational Corporation under International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 259, 259-60 (Michael
K. Addo ed., 1999) ("[MNCs] have acquired a great amount of power .... [O]f
the biggest concentrations of wealth in the world, 51% are owned by MNCs and
49% by states.").
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and "race to the bottom" on these issues, there is hardly any op-
portunity or forum for legal recourse against them. Given that
such an action can yield sizeable financial benefits, the incentives
to adopt that approach are huge. However, if there were an inter-
national legal arrangement binding on corporations, every major
corporation would be required to be a part of it. Certain business
principles, including transparency and anti-corruption initiatives,
will be part of that arrangement. Corporations that do not abide
by the principles can be sanctioned before a competent judicial or-
gan recognized by the international arrangement. This organ does
not necessarily have to be one tribunal situated somewhere far
from those who suffer the most from wrongful corporate behavior.
Instead, domestic judicial institutions in different parts of the
world can be empowered and deployed to hear claims against the
recalcitrant corporations. 290
In addition, the existence of binding international legal obliga-
tions from which corporations cannot easily get away would
strengthen their hands in negotiations and discussions with gov-
ernments that are inclined to take a different path. In essence, if
the government sees that a company is constrained to abide by in-
ternational obligations to disclose payments, it will be hard pressed
to accede to it. At least, it will not be so inclined to brand the cor-
poration as an enemy, as the government of Angola essentially did
when BP made public the signature bonuses it paid to the govern-
ment.291
The lack of international regulation of the sort envisaged here
will remain a strong impediment to the realization of the objectives
of the transparency campaigns and the efforts to get corporations
290 This would be similar to the practice under the Alien Tort Statute (also
known as the Alien Tort Claims Act) in the United States where rules agreed upon
by the international community are utilized in the domestic setting to hold corpo-
rations accountable for their actions that breach international law, even when such
conduct occurred outside the United States. For a rich body of commentary on
the Alien Tort Statute from divergent perspectives, see THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS
ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds.,
1999); GARY CLYDE HUF13AUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003); Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic
Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute
of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2004).
291 David Ivanovich, Oil Giants Say Disclosure Won't Work Everywhere, Hous.
CHRON., June 18, 2003, Business Section, at 1. For a further discussion on the im-
portance of, and impediments to, corporate regulation in international law, see
DURUIGBO, supra note 137, at 200-08.
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to play a greater role in addressing the resource curse.292
An additional tool that is worthy of consideration as a com-
plement or alternative to national trust funds is the institution of
sub-national or local trust funds.
7. LOCAL TRUST FUNDS
National trust funds have their advantages. They provide ave-
nues for transparently and accountably managing public assets
and ensuring that governments free more money for national de-
velopment. However, they have their limitations when it comes to
addressing some local issues.293 Where national officials are op-
posed to their establishment, this option may be foreclosed. This
does not have so many alternative sources of funding. Where oil-
producing states can have recourse to financing from private
commercial lenders and international institutions by, for instance,
borrowing against their oil wealth, the possibility of instituting a
Chad-like arrangement begins to diminish. 294 Thus, although
Equatorial Guinea is a small country, with a population of about
500,000, it may still flex its muscles because it has already come by
huge sums of money.295 For bigger and "richer" states, it is even a
tougher battle. As an experienced World Bank lawyer remarked to
the Author and others, "Who's going to tell Nigeria what to do?"2
96
292 A set of "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" was recently ap-
proved by the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). It has been
hailed as "the first nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level" to
govern the activities of MNCs and other business entities. Weissbrodt & Kruger,
supra note 138, at 913-14. The legal status of the norms is, however, open to doubt.
Professor David Weissbrodt, who chaired the committee that drafted the norms,
states that they are soft law. Yet, he believes that that they impose obligations and
differ from previous voluntary initiatives. It will be interesting to see what hap-
pens if any MNC does not abide by their dictates.
293 JEDREJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND LITIGATION BETWEEN
OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE CoMMuNITEs 52 (2000).
294 GARY & KARL, supra note 96; see also Duruigbo, supra note 169, at 183-84.
295 A recent report by Global Witness accused several leaders in Africa and
elsewhere of looting their own treasuries. Among them is Equatorial Guinea's
Teodoro Obiang, who calls oil revenues a "state secret" and is accused of keeping
oil companies' payments (running into hundreds of millions of dollars) in a bank
in Washington, D.C. under his own name.
296 Here, Nigeria can stand in for any large or rich country. See Ganesan, su-
pra note 7, for a discussion on how even Angola has proven less amenable to con-
trol or direction away from the corrupt and anti-people route embarked on by the
government.
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The transaction costs involved in administering gigantic funds
may also make such arrangements unproductive. Moreover, in
bigger countries, it is quite doubtful that a national fund will be
able to address the needs of all the people. Smaller arrangements
will be more manageable and may prove more effective. Thus,
community-based trust funds are a useful option.
297
The World Bank and MNCs could jointly play a role in setting
up these funds as a way of managing local oil revenues and corpo-
rate community development funds in a. transparent manner. This
is a positive gesture that does not place the sort of obligations that
governments would oppose because only corporate and other non-
government funds are involved. Even where the trust incorporates
public resources, the governments already spend money on some
of these issues, only they get mismanaged. Asking governments to
surrender to an extent their management of resources, while ex-
pecting to meet the opposition of those who profit from the present
corrupt schemes, may not be as threatening as the kind of national
schemes to which governments may object.
Local community members will play a key role in running
these funds by electing most of the trustees and keeping an eye on
their activities. In view of the fact that governmental involvement
has been a part of the problem of mismanagement, the role of the
government will be minimal; for instance, it can have a representa-
tive on the board of trustees. Governmental participation will en-
sure that the government does not oppose the constitution of the
trusts or refuse to contribute to their funding.298 Even in countries
with more efficient governments, a local trust fund can dispense
with governmental involvement or management. An example of a
community-based trust fund run independent of the government is
the Nunavut Trust of Canada. Svetlana Tsalik describes the fund
and its attraction as follows:
Unlike government-run oil funds, the Nunavut Trust is a
community-managed fund. It has earned strong returns
while maintaining accountability to its constituents and
serves as a good example for [other] underdeveloped oil-
producing regions.... The Trust also demonstrates how
these communities can be compensated for the negative ex-
297 For an- extensive discussion of community-based trust funds, see Du-
ruigbo, supra note 169.
298 Id. at 184-85.
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ternal consequences of oil development, and how they can
turn such compensation into an enduring source of in-
come.
299
It is heartening to note that preliminary discussions and corre-
spondence between the Author and representatives of corpora-
tions, communities, financial and development institutions and
non-governmental organizations indicate that they are amenable to
putting of this idea into operation.300
8. CONCLUSION
,Oil production, contrary to legitimate expectations and eco-
nomic theory, has not been largely beneficial to many countries
blessed with the natural resource. This problem is particularly
acute in Africa. Scholars in economics and political science have
tried to explain the resource curse, attributing it to a number of fac-
tors. As more African countries make a foray into oil develop-
ment, there is the concern that they may go the way of their prede-
cessors. It is imperative therefore to design arrangements that will
help address this problem in both old.and new producers.
A number of ideas have been generating interest as panaceas to
the resource curse. 30' They include promotion of revenue trans-
parency by oil corporations and oil-exporting governments. This
form of information . disclosure, exemplified by the EITI302 and the
PWYP Campaign, 303 promotes the publishing of corporate pay-
ments to governments and expects the governments to disclose
their oil receipts. The object is to ensure that oil revenues are fully
accounted for and properly utilized.
Suggestions also include different kinds of funds for stabiliza-
tion, sterilization, and for proper allocation and utilization of re-
sources. A stabilization fund would provide well-needed mitiga-
tion to the price shocks that have become a part and parcel of the
oil industry. A sterilization fund would keep resources away from
officials who are prone to engender the Dutch Disease through ir-
responsible application of resources. 304 Funds controlled by a trust
299 TSALIK, supra note 254, at 64.
300 See Duruigbo, supra note 169.
301 See Karl, supra note 32, at 16.
302 EITI, supra note 228; see also WBG Endorses EITI, supra note 242.
303 See Palley, supra note 245, at 92.
304 Utomi, supra note 54, at 25.
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or trust-like institution are viewed as particularly important in the
petroleum industry where oil trusts can provide an effective check
on rent-seeking activity, -improve domestic governance in oil-
producing countries and avoid, mitigate or reverse the resource
curse.305 An institutional arrangement by which an independent
institution under the direct control of the judiciary is assigned the
responsibility of monitoring the management of petroleum funds
has also been proposed.306
Revenue distribution arrangements are also being promoted.30 7
The idea is that such distribution will offer citizens the benefit of
resources with which their country has been endowed, while tak-
ing away huge revenues from the government in order to enable
the political leaders to build enduring institutions for economic
development.308 The need for reform of government institutions
cannot be overemphasized. Accordingly, scholars have been fo-
cusing on the importance of transparency in governance, democra-
tization and reforms of taxation and the civil service.30 9
Changes in the ownership structure in the oil industry have
also been proposed as an option that could most effectively lead to
democracy and economic development.310 Perhaps, this can be
achieved through privatization, which has also been commended
as a way to steer states away from a rentier state mode and avoid
the resource curse. The contention here is that in countries where
the element of political contestation is present, transferring the
ownership of the oil industry to private domestic interests obviates
some of the problems attendant to the concentration of oil re-
sources in the government or foreign private interests. Building on
305 Krasner, supra note 181, at 41.
306 See LEONARD WANTCHEKON, WHY Do RESOURCE ABUNDANT COUNTRIES HAVE
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS? 21 (Yale Univ. Leitner Ctr., Working Paper No.
99-12, 1999) (discussing the independent organization which manages profits
from Alaska's natural resource development).
307 Id. (proposing the Alaskan model).
308 See SALA-I-MARTIN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 5, at 3; "PALLEY, supra note
18, at 12.
309 See Karl, supra note 32, at 16 (describing the process of Russian tax re-
form); see also Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal, Contra Coercion: Russian Tax
Reforn, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change, 98 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
139 (2004).
310 See Ricky Lam & Leonard Wantchekon, Political Dutch Disease 17 (unpub-
lished paper presented at the N.E. U. Dev. Consortium Conference, Montreal, Oct.
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the argument that the resource curse is associated with state own-
ership, this argument calls for privatization.
311
This work has closely examined two of these proposals,
namely national oil trusts and information disclosure arrange-
ments. It has evaluated them and noted some impediments sur-
rounding them. Most significantly, state sovereignty is a critical
factor that needs to be aligned to the interests of the people, not the
corrupt and oppressive governments. Corporate regulation in in-
ternational law is also of critical importance. Not satisfied that
only national solutions are needed and recognizing that some na-
tional prescriptions may be infeasible, this work also argues that it
will be helpful to consider local-based, solutions. Accordingly it
canvasses the institution of local trust funds as a complement or al-
ternative to national trust funds. The World Bank and MNCs can
play an important role in this regard.
311 See Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal, Energy Wealth and Tax Reform
in Russia and Kazakhstan, 27 REsouRcEs POL'Y 215 (2001) (discussing possible solu-
tions to the resource curse); Luong & Weinthal, supra note 62, at 28.
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